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ABSTRACT The violent history shared between Catholic and Protestant ethnic/religious groups in Northern Ireland has deteriorated the trust between both communities and public institutions. This conflict is most acute in Belfast, Northern Ireland's urban center, where 'peace lines' have been constructed to divide the two conflicting ethnic/religious groups. Planning agencies have struggled having to plan around the confines of conflict. These measures have resulted in managing conflict, and as a result it has been difficult for these agencies to resolve long term planning problems. In addition, planning agencies have relied on technical analysis and in doing so have inadvertently ignored deeper social issues. This is exhibited in plans and polices thus far that have concentrated on technical analysis in decision making. The organizational problem is that Northern Ireland is notably different from the rest of the U.K., and therefore traditional planning practice is not enough to ensure successful urban development. By incorporating conflict resolution strategies into the planning process many of the problems can be successfully accomplished. The strategies for conflict resolution that are incorporated into the planning process are defined as consensus building, facilitation, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and evaluation. Building trust is central throughout the entire planning process. If planners were to incorporate these strategies they would be more successful in achieving goals and objectives. It is designed to start locally and grow nationally, and as it does the issue between national territorial ownership increasingly becomes inconsequential because the residents associate themselves more within a co-existent community. Vll 
Ideally, Northern Ireland becomes one independent and collective nation based on internal resolution. vm 
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Chapter One: Thesis Overview 
Introduction The purpose of this thesis is to gain a better perspective of the role urban planning has in a shift from conflict management to conflict resolution. It will not presume to prescribe a solution to conflict in totality, but rather how urban planning agencies have a vested interest and how they can influence the process of resolution rather then managing conflict as a coping mechanism. The focus area of this study is Belfast, Northern Ireland, which currently integrates conflict management into urban planning policies. This integration is the result of a violent history of conflict shared between Catholic and Protestant ethnic groups. Conflict management, as defined by Susan Stewart (1998), suggests that a problem is removed from a situation for a certain period of time, but still has an underling potential for conflict to erupt. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, eliminates the dispute in its entirety (Stewart, 1998). Many complications that urban planners face in Northern Ireland, as well as in many other countries, are directly linked to strategies that attempt to manage conflict. As a result, it is difficult to resolve underling issues critical to a successful planning process. This thesis will identify these strategies and describe how it has prolonged the division between Catholics and Protestants, as well as how a shift from conflict management to conflict resolution can go further in eliminating historical ethnic polarization. In considering a shift in conflict management to conflict resolution four factors must be addressed to fully understand the complexity of this paradigm. These include the history of ethnic division, demographics, interagency structure, and planning policy. 
1 
These factors are individually powerful, and together they have been successful in creating a segregated community structure. This success is both blessed and cursed because the result of segregation protects the public but also reinforces hostility. These factors have influenced community structure and are counter-productive to resolving internal conflicts that arise periodically. In order for a paradigm shift to occur, elements that influence community structure have to be identified. Belfast Northern Ireland has remained predominately segregated since the onset of English political control in the 1 ih century (Seaton, 1998). Today, communities within the city remain, in most part, entirely segregated based upon religious ethnic identity. These homogenous communities are both segregated out of will and enforcement as the result of conflict between Protestant and Catholic groups. Combined these groups contribute almost exclusively to the total population and are evenly divided in number (NISRA, 2003). Since 1969, Northern Ireland has been most noted for it's sectarian violence and wide spread political unrest (Donnan, 1997). This recent history is commonly referred to as "the troubles" (Neill, 1993). It was at this critical point that Catholics began to protest against civil rights and the unequal policies that segregated their community. (See Appendix I) To understand the implications of segregated community structure, it is first important to understand the political structure of_Northern Ireland as well as its relation to England. This structure is responsible for how policies are administered and have helped to reaffirm segregation. Today, many planning decisions are made indirectly through the British government. The Department of Environment, Belfast Development Office (BDO), is responsible for overseeing all planning projects within the city (Neill, 1993). 2 
In face of this centralized power, the elected Belfast city council only has the right of being consulted on planning matters. As a result, many planning strategies are closely intertwined with conflict management policies between multiple agencies as a means to control sectarian violence. The most predominant and challenging planning strategy is the creation of physical barriers, known more commonly as 'peace lines' (Murtagh, 1995). Peace lines divide communities in an attempt to minimize sectarian violence between Catholic and Protestant ethnic groups. There are currently thirteen 'peace lines' in Belfast. These structures are nearly 20ft high and made of steel, barbed wire, and concrete (Murtagh, 1995). In addition, the barriers create a sense of boundary or edge between the two communities, which reinforce territorial convictions. Multiple agencies with vested interests were responsible for the creation of 'peace lines', but as indicated in a 1987 Housing Executive report 'Coping with Conflict' those same agencies are not responsible for improving the conditions in and around these areas. This thesis will describe how planning has shaped the urban spatial structure, the problems created by conflict and managing for it, as well as how a shift from managing conflict to resolution could resolve other fundamental planning problems in Belfast. Thus far, policies have failed to solve deeply rooted ethnic division within shared segregated geographical areas. 'Wedge planning' describes the means of which planning has taken place in these communities as a means to cope with conflict. Much of the information is based on literature obtained in relation to Belfast Northern Ireland, however it is intended to provide examples and possible solutions to common problems found in other communities that experience conflict as a result of ethnic division. This research will 
3 
provide alternative principles for urban planning to help foster a more proactive movement beyond managing conflict to a more fruitful process of resolution. 
Comments on the Literature A large amount of literature has been published on both conflict management and conflict resolution. To narrow the focus, this thesis concentrates on literature that relates to case studies of conflict management and the process or implications it has had on Northern Ireland, and other countries that encounter similar problems. Additionally, it examines the limited number of studies that illustrate conflict resolution and the peace process in that country. Northern Ireland is not an island into itself in terms of conflict. Other countries have struggled with the similar conflicting issues (Gidron, 2002). Therefore, an examination of examples similar to that of Northern Ireland should also be included. Those countries that are most similar include Israel and apartheid South Africa. The process that these countries have followed can provide alternative means for achieving resolution over management. Some literary sources use the words management and resolution interchangeably (Stewart, 1998). This presents a challenge to the research, in which techniques being utilized must be identified as management or resolution strategies. If the strategies are misrepresented, the research itself is in jeopardy of being misleading and fails to successfully create a shift from conflict management to conflict resolution. Many of the strategies that have been utilized are in effect the initial steps to resolution, but have not taken extra measures to move forward in the process, and therefore are still considered tools for managing conflict. 
4 
There is a wealth of information on Belfast and Northern Ireland in terms of it's history, conflict, and urban planning. Of all the literature in review, this information is the most abundantly available. This information provides a solid foundation for reviewing the number of conflict management techniques that have been utilized. The most profound and essential information is the evenly divided ethnic social structure, which has been revealed in both 1991 and 2001 census information. This information together with urban planning initiatives will help to identify conflict management strategies that are at the core of policy making; thus enabling the ability to present alternative planning measures that facilitate a shift from conflict management to a more finalized resolution. 
Research Question How can urban planning policy move from focusing on conflict management to conflict resolution? 
Methodology To answer the research question, the following steps will be taken to achieve a thorough examination of the elements that are most indicative of the current state of conflict in Belfast Northern Ireland. 1. Describe the socio-economic dynamics of the ethnically divided population. 2. Summarize the cause and key events that have resulted in ethnic conflict. 3. Describe the role of planning in creating physical barriers to separate the conflicted populations. 4. Describe the theories of conflict management and conflict resolution, and identify their similarities and differences. 5 
5. Identify planning principles that support conflict resolution theory. 6. Apply those principles to planning strategies that can be used to facilitate a paradigm shift in approaching conflict issues. Examples: • Cross-cultural mediation and communication to define commonalities in societal goals • Identify forums for communication among those with common concern. • Identify non-traditional leaders to facilitate dialog in and between communities. • Identify symbolic projects and programs that support the improvement of common concerns. • Select a symbolic elimination of a physical barrier that is relatively low risk to both communities. • Create collaborative voice to facilitate the marginalization of extremists. 
Overview of Chapter Contents This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter one is the introduction consisting of a brief overview of the current situation of conflict in Northern Ireland, a literature review of relevant literary materials, the research question and the methods for research. Chapter Two outlines the socio-economic dynamics representative of Belfast, as well as the social perceptions between the two ethnic communities. Chapter Three illustrates the key events of ethnic conflict that have shaped the· physical and social character of Northern Ireland and more specifically the Belfast urban area. Chapter Four identifies the stakeholders within the urban planning network, how these agencies have and do conduct planning within the city, and how conflict management has been at the core of 6 
their polices and initiatives. This chapter also identifies the interface communities that are directly affected by planning strategies, as well as obstacles now faced by agencies due these implemented strategies. Chapter Five provides a thorough examination of conflict management and conflict resolution, the similarities and differences to both and barriers to implementing resolution strategies. The chapter concludes by identifying additional tools that can be utilized to complement conflict resolution. Chapter Six brings the elements of socio-economic dynamics of the population, planning agencies, and resolution techniques together to create alternative strategies to bring about the peaceful resolution of conflict between both the Catholic and Protestant communities in the context of urban planning initiatives. Chapter Seven is the summation of the thesis, the possible limitations and constraints and further research that can be conducted to promote the peaceful resolution between communities in Northern Ireland as well as other communities faced with similar conflict. 
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Chapter Two: Socio-Economic Dynamics of the Population 
Socio-Economic Dynamics 
Social Characteristics Northern Ireland is geographically the size of Connecticut (Seaton, 1998), and has a population of 1.6 million (NISRA, 2001). According to the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Association (2001), the population is 39% Protestant and 38% Catholic in ethnic origin. The other 23 % make up a culmination of other ethnicities. These numbers have changed only slightly in the last thirty years. The change is attributed to an increase in population in the Catholic community. For centuries, Protestants have contributed to a somewhat larger segment of the population, however the Catholic community's figures are only slightly smaller and continue to show growth at an accelerated rate (Seaton, 1998). The distribution of population between the two groups contributes in part to the Protestant's historic hold of power and discrimination over the Catholic community. Until thirty years ago, the Catholic community had little to no organization in voicing their concerns over issues related to civil rights. As Catholic population numbers grew and conditions deteriorated in their communities, they began to arm themselves and attack in both peaceful and violent ways. Belfast has a population of almost 280,000 people and a density of 24 persons per hectare (NISRA, 2001 ). Table 2.1 illustrates that interface communities within the urban area experience relatively higher densities, which can be attributed to an urban setting. However, as illustrated, Catholic communities are of the highest density. 9 
Table 2. 1 :  Resident Population, Ethnic Composition & Density (NISRA 2001)  
Ethnic Ethnic Al l Area Population 
Association Composition Community Persons Males Females (hectares) Density 
N/A Belfast 277391 1 29778 14761 3 1 1 488 
Catholic '>80%} Ardoyne 6591 3032 3559 58 
Protestant '>60%} Balleymacarrett 4939 2258 2681  78 
Catholic '>90%} Clonard 441 9  2084 2335 61 
Protestant '>90%} Duncairn 3997 1 859 21 38 924 
Catholic �>90%) Falls 5043 2268 2775 1 20 
Protestant '>90%) Island 4275 1 988 2287 38 1 
Catholic '>80%) New Lodge 5214 2431 2783 72 
Protestant '>70%) Shaftesbury 5745 2750 2995 223 
Protestant '>90%) Shankil l 3790 1 744 2046 93 
Protestant '>90%) Woodvale 4609 2086 2523 57 This is one indication that Catholic communities are experiencing overcrowding as a result of an increase in population growth. Protestant communities that show higher figures of density also have lower levels of religious composition. For example, Balleymacarrett has a population density of 63 persons per hectare, and a religious composition greater than 60 percent. This may indicate in-migration of the Catholic population. These are basic assumptions and further analysis would be needed to determine its validity. One observation is certain, the number of women in each community is slightly larger than its male counter-part. Several studies have indicated that women are more likely to accept people of other religious origin and favor attempts of cross-community interaction (Gidron et. al. , 2002; Seaton, 1 998; Murtagh 2002) . This willful interaction is an important indicator and factor in moving towards a peaceful resolution. 
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Housing Catholic families tend to be larger in number than Protestant families, and as a result have a higher rate of population growth in Northern Ireland (Murtagh, 1995). This contributes to overcrowding in homes with two or more family members sharing bedrooms. Overcrowding is not limited to individual homes, but to entire communities as well. While Catholic communities are overcrowded and in desperate need for space, Protestant communities are blighted with vacant dwellings on nearly every street. According to the 1991 census, Catholic communities are on average 12% more overcrowded than Protestant and integrated neighborhoods (NISRA 1991 ). This is illustrated in the map of religious distribution in Belfast (page xvii) where clearly Catholic population represents significantly less territory. Throughout the United Kingdom there is a general concern about the growing gap between the cost of housing and household incomes (NIHE, 2001). In Northern Ireland, first time buyers are having a difficult time buying property in the location of their choice. The average cost of a home in Belfast is nearly one hundred thousand dollars (NIHE 2001). The alternative to this is the social housing program. Based on figures presented by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, the waiting list for public housing is greatest in areas in close proximity to interface areas and the number of available dwelling units in the social housing sector is much greater in these locations (NIHE, 2001). This limits people to particular locations of residence most commonly in interface areas. In December 2000, the total waiting list for homes was 32,056; almost half of the applications were for housing transfers (NIHE, 2001). Problems in infrastructure, physical space, and availability are all common problems that planning 11 
agencies are struggling to solve. Peace lines dividing residential areas further hinder possible solutions that could be achieved. 
Children and the Educational System The long-term antipathy between the two communities has created an ethos, in which the opposing ethnic group is "demonized" (Seaton, 1 998). Children learn these values from their families and community environments. As a result, violence has become a common part of the socialization experience for children. As one resident explained, the rioting season is at its peak during the summer months after children leave school for holiday (Denvir, 2002). Currently, the judicial system lacks law for punishment against children who participate in unlawful acts of violence and vandalism. During riot outbreaks, adults (many just old enough to be prosecuted by law) stand along the fringe encouraging children to engage in unlawful acts. This is the result of current policies within the judicial system, which cannot punish children under the same laws that pertain to adults. A very small percentage of students are enrolled in integrated schools. In these schools administrators attempt to create a curriculum, which teaches students an understanding of both traditions. The majority of children are in either state schools that promote a British Unionist tradition; or in Catholic schools, which promote Irish Nationalist tradition. Despite attempts at cross-cultural programs between schools, children tend to be isolated from each other and from opposing traditions (Murray, 1995). Catholic children tend to have higher dropout rates than do Protestant children, which contributes to higher unemployment rate (Seaton, 1 998). 
12  
Institutions Social institutions are considered to be structural reinforcers of the internal conflict within Northern Ireland. The community's fundamental interests are incompatible in their present structure; for the Protestants it is security and for Catholics it is equality (Raune et. al., 1991). Measures have been taken to restructure institutions in an attempt to address these concerns. For example, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), have until recently included an overwhelming majority of officers who are predominately Protestant. Part of the Good Friday Agreement, was to restructure the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and tum it into the PSNI. The RUC has been criticized for it's ethnic/religious profiling and was authorized to restructure its force to include more members of the Catholic community. The two main objectives within this restructuring were to hire a balance of officers from both ethnic groups and abolish a procedure to swear allegiance to the Queen. The demands of coping with terrorist organizations of both groups have compromised human rights (Seaton, 1998). Due to the lack of confidence in the police system in Catholic inner city neighborhoods, many residents in these communities rely on the IRA to operate a quasi-police force. Incidences of punishment, beatings, shootings, and threats of exile to Ireland have become common. As a result, this has reinforced both the power and prestige of paramilitary organizations within Catholic communities, and further eroded the sense of security for the Protestant population. For crime statistics. 13 
Economic Characteristics The significant increase in violence has had a strong effect on the economy. Business is generated by conflict due to high incidences of property damage caused by vandalism. The number of construction related businesses are particularly significant. For example, glass manufacturing is a very lucrative industry due to the high level of vandalism throughout the city, which targets both residential and commercial areas. There is also a large market for private security firms to provide surveillance personnel in commercial businesses and construction sites, as well as personal systems within residential homes. The British government pays for the cost of damages to property and injuries suffered by people in connection with terrorist attacks, an estimated 40 million dollars annually (Seaton, 1998). Within the middle class community, there is little reason financially to discourage vandalism because many of their wages are derived either indirectly or directly from such activities. The professional or white-collar neighborhoods benefit from inexpensive housing and excellent schools for their children. In addition, all families in all communities ·benefit from annual subsidies of several billion dollars in maintenance of public services (Seaton, 1 998). 
Unemployment The unemployment rate in Northern Ireland was 11 % in 2002, and about 21 % of households received income support (NISRA, 2003). These figures are much higher in inner city neighborhoods of Belfast as the unemployment rate is 31 % and 41 % of households receive income support (NISRA, 2003). Job losses have been most profound in shipbuilding, heavy engineering and textile ·sectors, which formed the basis of Protestant working class employment. Employment growth has been greatest in the 14 
public and service sectors, areas that have traditionally benefited Catholic job chances (Murtagh, 2002). These structural changes have had uneven effects on the spatial economy and especially in the working class Protestant areas that have struggled to cope with de-industrialization. When associated with socio-demographic changes, the decline of inner city communities was bound to be disproportionate between Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods. In the 1980' s 'reimaging' in the city was the central focus for stimulating the economy. Urban regeneration targeted the expansion of the retail sector and office development. The main beneficiaries were the prosperous middle-class whose income was strengthened with high public spending (Neill, 1995). The project met criticizism for the lack oflong-tenn sustainability that it was projected to create. By 1994 retail growth had reached its plateau as rental space remained static (Neill, 1995). It was also unable to bring about a change in the larger unemployment situation. Many employees in the service industry live from paycheck to paycheck, as well as a significant number of temporary administrative opportunities, which do not support a sustainable means of mcome. A project aimed at job creation in the urban area was "Making Belfast Work" program. Initiated in 1988, the program aimed to "stimulate greater economic activity, reinforce local enterprise, improve the quality of the environment and equip the people of these areas to compete successfully for available employment" (Murtagh, 1995). It accomplished this by providing more funding for schools, local health care facilities, job clubs, and adult education programs. In an evaluation of the program in 1993 no significant improvements to unemployment had been made placing the blame on the low 15 
level of finance and the complexity of the deprivation problem (Murtagh, 1995). Other programs that have been established to improve the unemployment situation include the New Action Community Employment program and the Belfast Action Teams of which success or failure has not yet been determined. 
Intercommunity & Cross Community Perceptions & Attitudes There are two separate attitudes shared by both ethnic communities, attitudes towards those that share their own identity and those of the other ethnic group. According to data collected in both communities, a constant theme across all study areas is that Protestant communities judge Catholics less acceptable than Catholics do Protestants (Murtagh, 1995), although a majority of residents on both sides said that they would consider allowing members from another ethnic group to join clubs and societies and visit into one's neighborhood (Murtagh, 1995). As Catholic housing pressure continues to grow and as vacancy rates increase in Protestant neighborhoods, any in-migration would be perceived as the beginning of the end for the existing resident community. Due to the genuine fears over the future of territory and community stability, it is necessary that communities feel confident about their own identity and future stability before any cross community initiatives would be successful. Movement patterns and feelings of fear and threat depend on the level of tension or violence within close proximity to the community. The tension and violence increase at different times of the year. In particular, there is a feeling that traditional anniversaries, marches, and parades are contributory to the increased tension and hostile outbreaks . The implications are that this is where local community relation efforts should be targeted. 
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Peace building, conflict resolution, and cross community organizations have all been established to work within each or both the Catholic and Protestant communities in an attempt to bring about a peaceful coexistence. These organizations are varied, complex, and multifaceted with their own agendas. However, the general attempt of these organizations is to develop agendas that build on positive and productive links between the two communities. A recent study by the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) estimated that there were over 5,000 active voluntary organizations absorbing 400 million dollars annually (Gidron, 2002). Many of the organizations that have been established are a direct result of the conflict associated between the two communities. Members of these organizations range from middle class individuals, whose motives are general altruism and philanthropy, to individuals with more immediate reasons for activism, such as living in areas affected by political violence (Gidron, 2002). Presumably, there is some degree of danger in the involvement with such organizations, however in reflection of the number that have been established the danger must be considered minimal. 
Community Life at Interface Areas Boal (1969) suggests that there is an inverse relationship between the degree of assimilation between two ethnic groups and the degree of residential segregation that exist between them. Increasing assimilation will be accompanied by decreasing segregation and the physical separation of residence may contribute to and reinforce division (Boal, 1969). The positive side of segregation is that concentration allows a group to maintain its social cohesion. It maintains cultural values, it strengthens social networks, and it allows the passing of critical thresholds for the support of institutions 
1 7  
(Murtagh, 2002). Interface areas represent the locations where segregated communities 
exist next to one another. In Belfast, sectarian violence and vandalism commonly occur 
in these locations. 
Identified by Brendan Murtagh ( 1 995), there are four categories of people who 
live in interface areas . These include liberals, leaders, young toughs, and the apathetic. 
The liberals are considered to be the largest group in residence, and tend to have a 
positive attitude towards members of the opposing community. There are the leaders, 
representing a small number of the population, who posses a certain degree of control 
over the local community. Then there are the young toughs, generally male, who are 
identified as a key element responsible for violent and destructive behaviors. Generally, 
young toughs are unemployed, experience high benefit dependency, and achieve 
relatively low levels of educational attainment (Murtagh, 1995). As one Catholic resident 
stated, their benefit dependency is in retaliation against British occupation. "If the British 
government will not give up Northern Ireland territory than they will bleed British 
governments pockets dry" (Denvir, 2002). In addition, they generally have little 
investment in their own community. Many of these young toughs are under legal age of 
prosecution so their actions go unpunished. The final group of residents is the apathetic, 
which are small in proportion and have little allegiance to a majority religion, political 
party or ethnic code. The most rational start in building cross-community relationships is 
to facilitate dialogue between individuals who Murtagh ( 1995) characterizes as the 
liberals, as well as those in leadership roles. This has already been accomplished in many 
of the communities and the results have been overwhelmingly successful. 
1 8  
Three factors identified in a recent study, if acknowledged by planners and policy 
makers, could reinforce cross-community initiatives and policies for the future. First, a 
majority of residents living in interface areas have a positive attitude towards the 
opposing community and to the idea of community relations as part of local development. 
Second, such an initiative can be severely restricted by extremists in the community who 
can often determine the rules governing local community life and the scope of 
independent action. Third, for planning policy to have any success planners must 
recognize the rules governing them, the way they are imposed, and their effect on local 
initiatives (Murtagh, 1995). Including residents in the planning process, of which 
initiatives are targeted at their communities, would have a positive effect. 
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Chapter Three: Key Events and Causes That Have Resulted In 
Ethnic Conflict 
History of Territorial Conflict Historical events have shaped the dynamics of how individuals live in Northern Ireland. The native Gaelic inhabitants and those who reside there now have struggled for independence since the 16th century. Table 3.1 provides a chronological account of the historical events that have shaped the physical and social character of Northern Ireland (See also Appendix I). The British monarchs intention was to colonize the North with Scottish and English settlers to give Britain a stronger control over its rebellious territory (McShefferey, 2000). The significance of this action, and similar discriminatory behaviors is the root of the country's current instability. Though an overwhelming majority of the population have been born and raised in Northern Ireland, as were their parents and generations before them, harsh sentiments still run deep. Conflict between the two ethnic groups has been the focus of attention both nationally and internationally. The attention gained can be attributed to a series of violent attacks between various paramilitary organizations. In light of media attention, the Irish Republican Anny (IRA) is thought to be the primary terrorist organization associated with sectarian violence. More accurately, including the IRA, there are six primary paramilitary organizations in existence and most likely smaller more isolated cells. Those that identify themselves as fighters against British control include the IRA, or more accurately the Provisional IRA, and the Irish National Liberation Anny (INLA); and in tum those that are Loyalist include the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) 21 
Year Early 1600's Late 1600's 1690 1800 1800's Early 1900's 1916 1919 1920 1921 1948 1968 1972 1970's - 1980's 1985 1986 - 1991 1993 22 Table 3.1: Chronology of Events in Ireland From 1600-2002 Event Formal "Plantation" of Scottish and English settlers in Ireland. Repressive "Penal Laws" established to restrict Catholics education, property ownership, religious practice and political participation. "Battle of the Boyne" the defeat of Catholic James by Protestant William of Orange. "The Act of Union" formally making Ireland part of the UK. "Home Rule Movement" interest in gaining for local political power. Protestants (in attempt to preserve union with Great Britain) reject Home Rule. "Easter Rising" proclamation of the Irish Republic; rebellion was defeated. Sinn Fein representatives elected in Ireland; refused to attend session in London; formed its own parliament in Dublin. Irish volunteers later known as the IRA attack police and army; beginning of the Anglo-Irish War. "The Government of Ireland Act"; the partition of Ireland 26 counties in the south and 6 in the North each to have their own parliament and limited-self government. Republican movement rejected the act. Anglo-Irish War ends. The Anglo-Irish Treaty creating the Irish Free State. Self-governing but still apart of the UK. The Irish Free State becomes the Republic of Ireland and leaves the British Commonwealth. Civil rights campaign begins, Catholic want reforms for their community. Violence becomes common. "Bloody Sunday" unarmed civilians killed by British Army, violence escalates. N.I. Parliament "Stormont" suspended from direct-rule. High level of paramilitary violence. The Anglo-Irish Agreement; establishes consultation about N.I. by Ireland and Britain in attempt to resolve conflict situation. Heightened attacks by republican paramilitaries against British; loyalist paramilitaries attack Sinn Fein politicjans and activists. Downing Street Declaration- reaffirming attempt between Irish and British governments to resolve situation. 
Year 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 Table 3 .1: ( continued) Event IRA cease-fire is declared in august; loyalist cease-fire follows in October. IRA bomb attacks end cease-fire. IRA renews ceasefire; creation of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IlCD). Peace Agreement established to share power in political process; mainly allowing Sinn Fein to engage in talks with British government. Direct Rule Ends as powers dissolve in the Northern Ireland assembly. Direct Rule reinstated; New Inquiry into the events of "Bloody Sunday". IICD announces IRA has decommissioned; Direct Rule once again 
suspended after suspicion of IRA operations. (Source: Seaton, 1998; CNN.com 2003) operating as the Ul�ter Freedom Fighters (UFF), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) (Seaton 1998). Sectarian violence goes far beyond the reports of international media coverage. Common occurrences of violence and vandalism occur in residential communities on a frequent basis. Helicopters frequently patrol the skies to monitor outbreaks that occur (author, 2002). Physical barriers, known as 'peace lines' ,  have been erected to separate and minimize the threat of these incidences. At first glance, this may seem to serve as a solution, but it does not solve the deeper issues that result in conflict. In addition, such barriers create complications in other planning related areas and as a result under serve public needs. Discrimination is found in employment, education, housing, public services, and access to political power. In common inquiry, a person can determine an individual's religious or ethnic background by learning their last name, address, and/or educational 23 
history. Though human rights laws have been established, bias still remains a considerable problem and contributes to a large sector of the population seeking qualified employment. Ultimately, this creates skewed unemployment rates, and unnecessarily high levels of impoverished people with dependency on public housing and other services. Today, Northern Ireland is facing a pivotal point in its history as the Catholic population continues to grow and begins to replace the Protestapts as the largest ethnic group in the country. This has created an interesting paradox of shifting power that has tension mounting in every facet of Northern Ireland, and which is also beginning to circulate into British and Irish governments as well. The British government' s  control in Northern Ireland would have been limited without the help of a resident population in the 1 ih century, which supported its governmental control. The Protestant community eagerly took on this responsibility. In response, for centuries the British government has turned a blind eye towards ethnic injustices that occurred in Northern Ireland. · Today it is less obvious that such large-scale injustices occur, and though improvements have been made in the last twenty years, they still occur hidden behind politics and urban policies. It is difficult for the Protestant community to share power and control after being its sole proprietor for such a prolo11ged period. In recent years, Protestants have protested for the removal of Catholic political parties, most notably Sinn Fein. Questionable tactics have been used to create suspicions of Sinn Fein's knowledge and connection with unlawful acts perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). As a result, in October 2002 British government regained full control over Northern Ireland after alleged IRA activity. The Ulster Unionist political party refused to hold or attend sessions if Sinn 24 
Fein members were present (BBC News 2002). This most recent case demonstrates the underlying fear of sharing power with a political party that supports the rights of a population soon to be larger than its own. Since the 1998 Peace Agreement) which allowed power sharing as part of a deal for IRA ceasefire, the Ulster Unionist political party, has been searching for ways to regain control. In a sense this has been accomplished. In the fall of 2002, British Parliament reinstated its control over Northern Ireland after allegations from the Ulster Unionist political party accused Sinn Fein of having prior knowledge over an IRA arms dealing in South America and had leaked confidential d�cuments to the paramilitary organization (BBC News, 2002). These accusations have never been proven. Coincidently, the same political party that made accusations are still represented in the British Parliament. It proves that even at the highest levels of authority where policy making is accomplished bias can lead to corruptive acts to further disadvantage a select group of the population. 
Civil Rights Movement The civil rights campaign began in the mid-1960' s with the formation of small groups of Catholics who attempted to achieve reform by lobbying for an end to abuses, such as discrimination in jobs, housing, and unfair electoral procedures. Initially the campaign was in the form of letters, pamphlets, and small local campaigns. These attempts were largely unsuccessful. This was until the summer of 1968, when the first of a series of civil rights marches began to take place. The marches proved to be dramatically successful. In just over a year the movement had provoked a tension within political and security institutions. The effectiveness of the Catholic civil right movement 25 
was the product of changes on three levels: "changes in underlying power relations, conjunctural factors during the decade of the 1960's, and the specific character of the civil rights campaign" (Raune et. al., 1993). Grievances that were addressed included housing, industrial location, regional development, jobs in the public sector, which all had an impact on the Catholic community. Civil and minority rights movements were a growing trend internationally. The 1950's and 1960's provided models of non-violent protest : the Black civil rights campaign in the United States, the struggle against apartheid South Africa (Ruane et. al, 1993 ; Bollens, 1999). Demonstration and marches gained worldwide attention through publicized television broadcasts. Civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was part of this international trend, and as a result gained wider national and international support than traditional protest had done in the past. Marches in Northern Ireland proved to be more problematic than in other regions of the world. "The civil rights movement could not easily be fitted into the unionist conceptual categories and they found it difficult to know how to respond to it: as old fashion nationalism in a new guise or as a desire for greater equality within the union?" (Raune et. al., 1993). Civil rights marches that traversed Protestant territory were perceived as a direct threat to their own community. This provoked violence at interface and flashpoint areas. At that time the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the B Special forces were "defenders of the Protestant community first, defenders of the Protestant state second, and normal policeman third" (Raune et. al., 1993). As a result, security forces responded to the marches as hostile attacks often beating demonstrators with batons and forcing them back with water cannons or rubber bullets. This was shown 26 
on television broadcast throughout the world, and new civil rights organizations emerged demanding immediate response from the British government. The international · attention proved to be successful; government inquiry into such allegations led to a system wide restructuring process in many public and governmental agencies. 
International Commonalities Northern Ireland is only one region where ethnic conflict has dictated the amount of control that planning agencies have over urban and regional initiatives. Other nations have faced similar situations to varying degrees including Israel and Palestine, post­apartheid South Africa and until recently Germany. Continuing conflict has required the on going intervention of the government to manage such critical situations. This has had significant effects on community structure, which will continue to occur if the validity and appropriateness of traditional planning practice is not questioned nor evaluated on its role within the context of larger resolution strategies. It is important for the purpose of this thesis to acknowledge that ethnic problems are a global issue and as planning cannot be held solely responsible for resolving conflict. Likewise, not all nations are at a stage where resolution can be achieved. The situation in Israel and Palestine is one of the most extreme examples of where ethnic conflict affects the daily lives of its citizens. For decades the peace movement has made tireless efforts to gain national interest to end conflict. Today, it is still considered a failed attempt. The current instability of the situation can be characterized as one that Northern Ireland faced in the early 1970's at the height of the 'troubles'. At that time, England prepared to extract all Catholics from the their nation-state and relocate them to the Republic of Ireland (see Appendix I). "Many Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, 27 
and Israel express anxiety that the Israeli government may launch mass uprooting and expulsion" (AFSC, 2002). Today, extensive walls are being built around the Palestinians to reduce violence (Khatib, 2003). The words and actions are literally identical, but . unfortunately in the context of a more unstable environment. This is only one example, which further indicates the need for resolution strategies to be incorporated into the realm of planning in cooperation with other public and governmental agencies. Conflict resolution strategies in these contested areas have normally been instituted at a national or state level. "As a result of complex patterns of political and demographic change, the nation-state is decreasingly seen as the territorial answer to the problem of human political, economic, and social organization" (Bollens, 1999). The deterioration of stability in many nation-states has compelled international aid organizations, mediators, and political negotiators to look at sub-state regions and urban areas as more appropriate scales of involvement" (Bollens, 1999). This would have important implications on the role planning could have on the initiatives that are created to resolve ethnic conflict. Every nation-state and the urban areas within them are confronted with their own unique set and degree of ethnic disputes; however the basic human psychological behaviors are all very similar. To find a solution to conflict at a local or sub-state level could have more successful implications at a national level, and could be accepted as an example for other nations to follow. 28 
Chapter Four: Urban Planning in Belfast 
Political Structure and Core Planning Agencies 
Political Structure The political structure in Northern Ireland has fluctuated between various powers of authority in an attempt to maintain stability in the province. This has made it exceedingly difficult to determine the governmental entity in control and how decisions are being implemented. As part of the Northern Ireland Act in 1998, the Secretary of State, along with the House of Lords and the House of Common at Westminster, approved a devolution order to transfer certain powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont (CAIN, 2003). However, the power given to the Assembly has been suspended on several occasions, the latest being October 14th 2002. The result of these suspensions stem from instability and general deadlock of sessions due to the lack of trust between Protestant and Catholic political parties. At midnight on the 14th of October, Prime Minister Tony Blair indefinitely suspended the Northern Ireland Assembly (CAIN, 2003). The following day, John Reid, Secretary of State, expanded the responsibility of Northern Ireland Office Ministers. The Secretary of State represents the interests of Northern Ireland in the British Cabinet. This position, along with the legislative power of Westminster, has the authority to suspend the more localized power of the Northern Ireland Assembly (CAIN, 2003). At this writing, all decisions are made through the Office of Secretary of State. This office is responsible for policing, security policy, prisons, criminal justice, international relations, taxation, national insurance, regulation of financial services, and the regulation 29 
of telecommunications and broadcasting (CAIN, 2003). Four positions under the Secretary of State have assumed responsibility for departments formerly run through the Assembly (See figure 4.1 ). Minister of State assumed responsibility for the Departments of Education (DE), and Employment and Leaming (DEL). Other Parliamentary positions under the Secretary have assumed responsibility over the Departments of Social Development (DSD), Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS), Equality, Human Rights and Community Relations (DEHRCR), Finance and Personnel (DFP), Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI), Agriculture and Rural Development (OARD), Economic Policy Unit and Europe, Environment (DOE), Regional Development (ORD) and Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) (NIO, 2002). Below is an organizational chart of political offices and departmental structure within the context of Northern Ireland. The universal structure of political instability stems beyond national level politics and into local level jurisdiction. For example, chairmanships on [political] committees were held by Unionists parties at the exclusion of Nationalists including Sinn Fein, the 2nd largest party represented in the city council (Neill 1993). However, based on several court decisions in 1 993, Sinn Fein and other Nationalist parties were no longer excluded from council committees, or banned from civic functions, and for the first time were permitted equal access to all political documentation (Murtagh, 1995, 2002). This has been interpreted as a threat to Protestant's security and power. The result of shared power gives access to sensitive documents that could be used to undermine Unionist parties, and this ultimately weakens their sense of security. In addition, it gives new representation on committees that were historically one sided. 30 
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(Source: NIO, 2003) Figure 4.1: Political Structure & Departmental Responsibility Public issues that have been politically controlled in the past and raise question of equal civil rights in Belfast, and throughout Northern Ireland, include the ban of the Irish language, the failure to recognize Gaelic sports, while in tum honoring British symbols, such as the singing the British National Anthem and Royal toasts at all civic functions (Neill, 1993). These actions and symbols undermine the Catholic's sense of equality, though small achievements in equality have been achieved. In June 2002, for the first time since the creation of the position of Lord Mayor over a century ago, a Nationalist was elected. The Lord Mayor, Alex Maskey of the Sinn Fein political party, was inducted into office in June 2002 (BBC News, 2002). 31 
With respect to urban and regional planning in Belfast and throughout Northern Ireland, local government has little authority over the decision making process. Final decisions in planning are made by the Department of the Environment Belfast Development Office and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. These agencies often sub-contract projects out to consulting firms who follow guidelines established by the Royal Town Planning Institute. Due to the centralized power of the DOE and the regional NIHE, many private firms are restricted as to how a project will be conducted. This also holds true for academia. Universities are dependant on the DOE for research funds and cannot afford the luxury of taking a critical position "for fear of biting off the hand that feeds it" (Neill, 1993). Due to harsh public criticism over inequality over the last several decades, professional planners have often marginalized their work in an effort to maintain a safe balance on social issues. This approach has prolonged and enhanced the underlying social problems that so famously plague Northern Ireland. 
Department of the Environment Belfast Development Office The Department of Environment (DOE) makes all the final decisions concerning planning issues throughout the United Kingdom. The pivotal agency within the DOE responsible for the planning of Belfast is the Belfast Development Office (BDO). The DOE is in effect an extension of central British administration under the control of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. It has been described as having the administrative responsibility for all the strategic planning in Northern Ireland. The functions of the BDO include designing policy for the development and redevelopment of the city and where necessary creating the legislative framework for the implementation of that policy (Neill, 1993). 32 
In addition, the BDO facilitates meetings with various coordinating groups, which bring together government ministers and their officials, both administrative and professional, with representatives of Belfast City Council, statutory boards, trade unions, chamber of commerce, retailers, banks and professional institutions (Murtagh, 1995). These agencies are identified as stakeholders in the planning process. For example, the Office of Security under direct control of the Secretary of State is responsible for the authorization of 'peace lines' and the specific locations they would be built (NIHE, 2001 ). In addition, corporate developers have in the past had their own interests supported when consulted on planning matters. In the late 1980's and early 1990's, when 'reimaging' and privatization was at the forefront of planning initiatives, developers had access to closed planning meetings and were later contracted for those projects (Neill, 1993). 
The Housing Executive The Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) is not under direct control of the Secretary of State, however many of the policies and initiatives undertaken are influenced through governmental funding and an interconnected relationship with the Department of Social Development. The Housing Executive reports directly to a board, which is established through the Housing Commission. The Housing Commission established under the 1971 Housing Executive Act are consulted on all matters concerning the NIHE (NIHE, 2003). The commission is made up of 10 members seven of which are appointed the other three are nominated (NIHE, 2003). (See figure 4.2 NIHE organizational chart) 33 
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(Source: NIHE, 2003) Figure 4.2: Northern Ireland Housing Executive Organizational Chart As the government was breaking down and a mass population movement was occurring in 1969, so too was deterioration in housing and the need to make significant progress overwhelming. Many homes were overcrowded with little indoor plumbing and poor electrical and heating infrastructure. In the height of "the troubles", as life seemed bleak at best, a force of determination in improving housing conditions emerged. These conditions lead to the Housing Executive Act of 1971. Two people, one from the Ministry of Development and another from the Housing Trust, formed the NIHE (Brett, 1986). It resulted in an unprecedented act of an entire restructuring of a public administrative office in Northern Ireland. By late 1971, the first hearing on future housing principles and policies took place. Though many policies have been criticized in regards to discrimination, many improvements have been made in the form of low interest loans and housing grants for improvement, upgrading and rehabilitation to infrastructure. The NilIE is also responsible for managing public sector housing, which is largely located in close proximity to interface areas. It has been a slow process of 34 
improving housing conditions, and taken many years for the large-scale benefits to emerge. As of 2001, the Housing Executive manages over 30,000 dwelling units in the Belfast urban area (NIHE, 2001). The Northern Ireland Housing Executive is responsible for public sector housing management and improvements as well as private sector investments in the form of loans and grants. The NIHE has suffered the same criticism as other agencies, and as a result, the agency is determined to ensure equality between communities by building homes from a standard template. " Blandness has prevailed in public sector and the Housing Executive happily admits it is a "housing factory'' with only 24 housing types" (CMP Information Ltd., 2002). With over 30,000 homes and only 24 housing types, both communities are disadvantaged. Entire communities are left architecturally stale and lack the vibrancy and character that shapes cohesive residential communities. 
Planning Initiatives 
Focus on Privatization and the Central Business District Between 1970 and 1975, the IRA bombing campaign destroyed nearly 300 establishments in the Belfast city center and over a quarter of retail space (Neill, 1993). As a result, defensive strategies and policies were initiated to minimize conflict. In 1978, a review of the city's transportation strategies recommended a high-grade motorway. This initiative was the Westlink motorway that runs to the North and West of the city center. This created a divide between two high profile areas, the Falls and Shankill communities, well known for their riot activities. In addition, the Secretary of State, Roy Mason, established a committee to examine how to bring life back to the city and give it a brighter look. An external examination was also conducted to explore government 35 
partnerships with private developers to redevelop the city center. As a result, a beautification plan along the river Lagan was proposed. The failure behind these projects was the lack of response to critical social problems. The re-imaging of Belfast city center was further encouraged between 1980 and 1984, which can be contributed in part to a 'change in paramilitary strategy away from commercial bombing towards attacks on security forces and other state personnel (Neill, 1993). In part, this led to a relaxation of policies restricting city center curfews. As a result, retail businesses were operating with longer hours and many eating establishments reopened. Life in the city began to reemerge. Urban regeneration focused its attention on the expansion of the retail economy and office development. While this generated city council optimism, it also raised questions of sustainability. By 1985, the Belfast Urban Area Plan was published, a plan that focused strictly on 'reimaging' the city with little regard to the communities fundamental problems. In 1994, it was evident that the r�tail expansion had reached a plateau (Murtagh, 1995). Rental growth was fairly static and well-established businesses, dating bac� to the Victorian ages, closed their doors, unable to compete with corporate �evelop�ent. The year 1991 was another major image-promoting year for Northern Ireland in general and Be�fast in particular. A review of Belfast' city commercial property market uncovered a shift in development focus from retail to office uses. In addition, the Northern Ireland Department of Economic Development (1989) identified 'image' as the Province's major tourist marketing handicap. A new city plan was developed with a ten­year time frame with a goal recreating an image of Belfast. Its horizon was chosen in attempt to correlate the rate of urban change envisioned for Belfast and the lure of a new 36 
century approaching. The DOE released a preliminary report on the production of a Belfast City Center Local Plan, in which its final form was published in 1994 (Neill, 1993). The central aim was to "improve the world-wide image of the city-center" by among other things "creating a number of memorable places, buildings, and events and providing high quality shopping, leisure and tourist facilities to make the city an international center" (Neill, 1993). Several projects were singled out for improvements based on economic and historic images in the city. One such project was the Castle Court shopping center (see Figure 4.3). The renovations to the site proved to be a success and were heralded by city leaders. People returned in mass to shop at the new center. This was one indication that the city was returning to normality after two decades of violence. Another venture was the Laganside project that taps into the maritime tradition of Belfast (see Figure 4.4). The Laganside Harbor was the site of construction for the legendary ship Titanic. The project's aim was to transform a neglected waterfront area by creating interconnecting areas of commercial, retail, light industrial, recreation and leisure uses. Work began on the 100 million dollar project in 1992, with a completion targeted in 1996 (Neil, 1993). Public donation strengthened both projects in the form of infrastructure and environmental improvements. In light of these improvements, Belfast continues to be laden with symbols of British identity; The Cranes of Harland and Wolff symbolizing to residents that the Laganside Harbor is still Protestant territory, and the official statues and street names of British origination are liberally represented in the city center. 37 
(CAIN, 2003) Figure 4.3 : Castle Court on Royal A venue (CAIN, 2002) Figure 4.4: Laganside Development The theme surrounding the 'reimaging' of the city was "Belfast The Capital of Culture". However, those involved with implementing the plan did not consider or choose to ignore the deeper more critical concerns of ethnic conflict. Critics argued that the plan for the city center needed to be concerned with more fundamental issues and not superficial image (Neill, 1993). In sectarian terms it is not neutral territory. For a considerable time after the Anglo-Irish Agreement, at the instigation of Unionist City Councilors, a "Belfast Says No" banner was draped across the front of the city hall building, a public institution that until recently continued to fly the Union Jack. The banner indicated to both governments and the general public that the Unionists disliked the clause in the Anglo-Irish Agreement that underscored the importance of shared political power (Neill, 1 993). Within the constitutional arrangement at that time, cultural equality was impossible. It could not accommodate the conflicting identities that existed behind clashes of conventional ideology in Belfast. In this situation, the plan for "image" was a failure. It did not address the all too real ethnic division that existed. The Northern Ireland Tourist Board, in a shocking yet sobering statement, announced that "there could 
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t 
f t , well be a niche market in attracting the gaze of the curious 'terror tourist' (Magee and McGuckin, 1992). As one journalist suggested, "the macho prestige of holidaying in real live, but generally safe to bystanders, war threatens to turn Belfast into a terrorism theme park" (Margolis, 1993). Therefore, it can be argued that perhaps too much concentration on superficially 'reimaging' the city in the eyes of both Belfast residents, potential tourists, and investors was a distraction from dealing with real and deeply felt ethnic antagonisms (Neill, 1993). It can be argued that in a very weak regional economy, the main beneficiaries of the Belfast's Urban Area Plan for 'reimaging' have been the middle class whose income has been substantially strengthened· with high public spending on construction and who enjoy low cost housing, as well as the developers who took part in the planning process. However, the inability of the strategy to bring qualitative change in the social situation placed serious weight on the possibility of mobilizing consent behind a policy of planning for neutrality (Neill, 1993). The government was then pressured to focus its energy on greater public interest programs concerned with more practical matters, such as housing programs, economic strategies, and conflict management. Persistent unemployment and poverty led to criticism of the government's reliance on private sector development, largely shaped by the United States model of trickle-down economics (Neill, 1993), as a means to recovery. In response, a government program was created in 1988, known as "Making Belfast Work". It aimed to "stimulate greater economic activity, reinforce local enterprise, improve the quality of the environment and equip people with skills to compete successfully for available employment" (Northern Ireland Information Service, 1988). 39 
"Making Belfast Work", though not a planning initiative, targeted communities with high levels of unemployment and poverty. Money was spent on school equipment, local health care facilities, environmental h?provements, job clu�s, and adult education programs. Economic measures included the upgrading of training, and improvement in literacy and mathematics. A review of the program in 1993 concluded that no significant progress had been made in improving unemployment rates (Murtagh, 1995). It was further criticized for the lack of support that the government contributed financially in relation to the scale and complexity of the problem. In addition, the objectives were too varied, which led to a lack of focus in the program and to its abolishment in 1997. 
Planning for Conflict The most dramatic period of population movement, as a result of ethnic turmoil in Belfast, came between 1969 and 1973 when an estimated 60,000 people left their homes (Murtagh, 1995). The concentration of movement came from working class areas of North, West, and East Belfast as a result of intens� conflict be�een the Protestant and Catholic communities. In consequence to the violence, Northern Ireland Office of Security and the Newly formed Housing executive constructed thirteen 'peace lines' (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5). 'Peace lines' ar� tall physical barriers constructed of concrete and metal to separate opposing communities. (see Figure 4.6 and 4. 7) According to the BDO, the cost of construction was nearly two million dollars (Murtagh, 1995). The 'peace lines' had varying effects on both the neighboring communities and government services. It created a negative economic impact due to the loss of annual rent income either from residents choosing to relocate to amore safe environment or from restricted access to nearby commercial services. Most property at interface areas is owned and 
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Table 4.1: Belfast 'Peace Lines' and Adjacent Neighborhoods 
Adjacent Neighborhoods 
Peace l ine Catholic Protestant 
North Belfast 
.... All iance/Glenbryn Ardoyne All iance 
El imgrove Street Oldpark Avenue Torrens 
Manor/Roe Street Roseleigh Groomsport Court 
Duncairn Gardens New Lodge Tiger's Bay 
Crumlin Road Ardoyne Shanki l l  
West Belfast 
Unity Flats Unity Flats Lower Shankil l 
Northumberland/ Ardmoulin Divis Flats Shankil l 
Cupar Way Falls Shankil l 
Ainsworth Avenue Springdale Woodvale 
Springhi l l  Avenue Ballymurphy Springmartin 
Springmartin Road New Barnsley Springmartin 
East Belfast 
Lower Newtownards Road Short Strand Island 
Bryson Street Short Strand Bal lymacarett 
Cluan Place Short Strand Cluan Place 
(Source: Murtagh, 2002) 
- Peaee llne 
To Stewartstown 
Road 
(Source: Murtagh, 2002) Figure 4.5: Location of 'Peace Lines' Belfast Urban Area 41 
(CAIN, 2003) FigureJt.6: Example of a 'peace line' in North Belfast. (CAIN, 2003) Figure 4. 7: Example of 'peace line' Gate that restricts access in and out of interface communities. controlled by the NIHE. In addition, surplus land set aside for public housing was lost, a total property value of $400,000 (Murtagh, 1995), and local retail, services, and facilities were severely limited. Many of these businesses were forced to close or relocate. However, the psychological, physical, and economical impact on residents was the most serious. International media attention reporting on the conflict and the construction of 'peace lines' further proves the central position of 'reimaging' should not be the primary focus of planning policy in Belfast if it does not include resolution strategies. The harsh image of 'peace lines' promoted planning professionals to formulate design guidelines to soften the tone of hard concrete and steel frames by replacing them with colored brick, pastel renderings and extensive landscape. More recently, land acquisition has been used in an attempt to 'reimage' interface zones. Light industrial and commercial land uses provide an alternative buffer between two communities and at the same time dismantle the harsh image of a peace line. This 
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type of approach is described as 'wedge planning' where land uses are used to create a buffer between residential areas to cope with conflict. However, this is still a superficial response to the complex problems that characterize life within these communities. Based on empirical survey data, Brendan Murtagh ( 1995) suggests, " that effective and efficient movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic and the orderly management of resources, services and facilities have been at the core of planning practice and education". However, minority communities surrounded by 'peace lines' experience significant problems in activities such as getting to work, visiting friends and relatives and gaining access to health services and recreational facilities. In part, many people experience high poverty rates, which further limits their access to other benefits. These areas may have experienced high poverty levels before 'peace lines' existed, however these physical structures further hinder innovative improvements. The image and level of development of community infrastructure (i.e. 'peace line', and public facilities/services) limit solutions to local economic development opportunities. Economic indicators show that these areas have higher unemployment rates, have lower income, and have lower A level (high school) educational attainment. In addition, Catholic communities have higher levels of housing waiting lists, lower vacancy rates, and better correspondence between household size and property size (NISRA, 2001 ), which can all be attributed to the growing Catholic population. While on the other side of the peace line, Protestant's complain that their communities are full of bricked up homes, boarded up businesses, and vacant land because their residents are moving out of these areas for security reasons. These extreme polar situations are a clear indication of the public's need in both communities for successful planning strategies. 43 
Planning Problems Unlike traditional planning practice, which assumes the stability in institutional structures, contested cities must plan under conditions of instability and uncertainty. Given this situation, critical evaluation must question the very basis of traditional planning practice. Urban planning in Northern Ireland has focused on technical aspects in planning and has avoided any discussion concerning more anthropocentric issues. Furthermore, it has been ambivalent towards how the built environment should be structured when ethnic conflict is present. For example, where ethnic conflict is prevalent, physical barriers are constructed to separate opposing groups. The focus, largely driven by the Office of Security, is placed upon minimizing the current conflict. This serves immediate needs for safety and security; however it creates long-term negative implications in terms of public needs. The City of Belfast has indicated that the wishes to promote itself as one of culture. 'Reimaging' the city alone will not succeed in achieving this vision. If Belfast was able build an image based upon resolved differences, it wo�ld have a better chance at promoting itself as the 'City of Culture' . A trend that has emerged in the planning field is to create a central image of a community based upon a unique quality. Belfast, instead of capitalizing on the 'terror tourist', could create an industry around peace-building, functioning as model for other contested communities to follow. Belfast could become the center for international peace-keeping and conflict resolution forum, similar to Geneva Switzerland which has successfully promoted itself as "the forum for world negotiation" (Geneva Welcome Center, 2002). The only way to achieve a vision such as 
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this is to incorporate conflict resolution strategies into urban planning policies, which 
reach into nearly every function within the city. 
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Chapter Five: Human Behavior, Conflict, and Resolution 
Human Behavior Conflicting perceptions and attitudes between ethnic groups is not a unique phenomenon to Northern Ireland, as illustrated by the example of Israel/Palestine. These feelings are the result of a more deeply rooted ethos between man and the environment (Ittelson, 1974). The environment is interpreted as the physical surroundings within which humans live. In understanding the complexities of social conflict, it is important to identify how man interacts with the environment, shaping it and being shaped by it (lttelson, 1974). The identification of a few basic assumptions about this fundamental psychology underscores the complexities of common behaviors associated with the conflict in Northern Ireland: 1. A person experiences the environment through all the senses, which determines a particular response; 2. People are part of a larger system and how a person acts within it determines the setting; 3 .  The physical environment can influence human behavior in many ways and to various degrees; 4. The physical environment is fully intertwined to self-awareness; 5 .  The environment is often unnoticed until significant change occurs and adaptation takes place; 6. "The observed environment is not necessarily the real environment"; 7. The environment can be understood as a set of mental images that vary from one individual or group to another; 8. The environment has symbolic value to each individual person. (Ittelson et. al . , 197 4) 47 
Based upon these assumptions, if similar conceptions about the environment are not shared then there is a potential for conflict to occur. There are fundamental behavioral factors that ultimately affect conflict at varying stages and to different degrees, which have implications on effective resolution. These include those in relation to man and his environment, as well as behavior attributed to human interaction. A list of these factors is identified below to provide a comprehensive outline of potential behavior characteristics that are identified in conflict theory and the course towards resolution. 48 1. Cooperation-Competition., Actions that determine the course of conflict as a constructive problem-solving accomplishment or a competitive win-lose or more appropriately lose-lose product. 2. Social Justice: Each group or individual has a unique perception of what is fair resolution. 3. Motivation: Each group has associated needs. In order to achieve resolution these needs have to be identified as those that foster conflict or are fostered by conflict. 4. Trust: Distrust is destructive to the process of resolution. For resolution to occur an attempt is needed to identify the processes that foster trust and those that reinforce distrust. 5. Communication: Misunderstanding can lead to conflict, which can lead to the deterioration of communication. 6. Attribution Processes: Emotional responses toward the opposing group are influenced by what intentions are attributed to them and the degree of responsibility that is imposed upon them. 1. Persuasion: Efforts are often channeled into persuading the opposition of the soundness of one position. 8. Self Control: Effective resolution actions require self-control. Distractions, unexpected events, and emotions (i.e. rage, pride, anxiety) can lead to loss of the important long-term goals. 
9. Power: The distribution of power and how it is engaged influences the conflict resolution process. Power ( e .g. economic resources, information, legitimate authority) determines the degree of influence over all those involved in the conflict. 10. Violence: A destructive course of actions that result from conflict. 1 1 . Judgmental Biases: Misunderstandings, misperceptions, and potential biases interfere with the constructive resolution process. 12. Personality: Individual personalities influence their decisions and actions as well as those of others, which have a powerful affect of how resolution takes place. (Deutsch et. al., 2000) This has important implications when attempting to understand territoriality of groups. In the context of Belfast's interface communities, the sense of identity is territory. To lose territory is to lose one's identity. In Northern Ireland this is associated to ethnic/religious identity. The Protestants are in fear of losing their territory, while the Catholics are outraged by the lack of control over territory. This equates to the Protestant's need for security and the Catholics need of equality. Defense is a mechanism used by individuals or groups to maintain its territorial integrity (Porteous, 1977). Understanding the psychology intrinsic to individual and group response of territory will help practitioners understand the insecurities of both communities, which will contribute to a better approach in planning. " The value of perception, attitude, and preference studies for planning lies, first in discovering regularities and consistencies in behavior from empirical studies, and second, in sensitizing planners to individual and group differences" (Porteous, 1977). In planning terms, individual and group enlightenment may be achieved by discoveries of perceptions in both problems and solutions that differ between individuals and groups. 
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This can be a powerful cognitive tool in planning. There are, however, several problems and limitations that impact the effectiveness and reliability of the information being received from participants; information can be easily misrepresented or skewed; the measurability of attitudes and perceptions is debatable, and at best can only be measured through observation; "bias is inevitable"; and continuous questions and interviews can lead to an unwillingness to participate (Porteous, 1977). To overcome such limitations, there needs to be a synthesis between theory and practice, in which science and practical experience collectively contribute to the overall objective. 
Conflict Theory and Practice There are as many definitions for conflict as there are theories, but for the purpose here conflict can be defined as the stage at which the relationship between two interdependent groups are in total disagreement over shared territory, resources, and the power over both. "The conflict in Northern Ireland is at its very basic a struggle between those who wish to see Northern Ireland remain part of the United Kingdom and those who wish to see the reunification of the island of Ireland"(Deutsh et. al., 2000). This single assumption is the motive behind every approach to conflict resolution, which has always materialized from a national, multi-national, and/or international level. Greater emphasis towards resolution should be focused at the local level where territory is at the root of every public decision. In this case, when decisions are made, one group will not be compromised at the expense of another or marginalized by the decision maker in an attempt to avoid persecution. This only prolongs problems and further exacerbates the conflict. 50 
There are a number of problems in the planning field (i.e. housing, economic development, and public infrastructure) because agencies have focused on technical aspects and evaded the social implications of many former projects. The solution is in the problem. The only foreseeable way to correct these problems is to move away from marginalized planning where decisions are based on strategies to cope with violence, and allow room for new strategies to be developed that incorporate conflict resolution into the planning process. To accomplish this the planner must take on the role of social scientist and practitioner of conflict resolution at a community level. Here, simple changes can make a difference in the outcome of the larger social problem that exists in Northern Ireland. There are inevitable differences between theory and practice of the conflict theory discourse. As in many social science disciplines, there is a disconnect between science and practice. Science is criticized as being impractical, while aversely the practitioner is regarded as unscientific (Isenhart et. al., 2000). To engage in a conflict resolution strategy that is centered upon deeply embedded ethos of power, security, territory, and ethnic/religious identity it will require a synthesis of both scientific theory and practical application. This is required to achieve a truly successful conflict resolution. A practitioner must take into account the many theories of conflict and pull practical information from each with relevance to the given situation. There is no well defined procedure for accomplishing such a complex task. Morton Deutsch (2000) points out that practitioners often work intuitively without being able to specify precisely how they are weaving together the theoretical ideas being utilized. It is for this reason that a synthesis 51 
of ideas obtained from multiple and overlapping theories is used to provide relevant knowledge that can equip planners with practical strategies for resolving conflict. 
Theories of Conflict Historically, the study of conflict has been revisited time and again with such names as Charles Darwin with survival of the fittest; Karl Marx with the Communist Manifesto and class struggle; as well as Sigmund Freud with his theory of psychosexual development of struggle between biological id and social determination and the superego (Deutsch, 2000). Many of their ideas were manipulated into other forms of rationale where new evolutionary forms of empirical orientated and socio-psychological theories began to emerge. These theories are closely connected to social behaviors discussed earlier and in their own form resemble the conflict dynamics that are occurring in Northern Ireland. These theories include: 52 I .  Attribution Theory: This perspective is based on attribution processes, which proposes that individuals make sense of their world by assigning qualities and causes to others based on what is relevant to them. Many Protestants and Catholics commonly attribute their current situation based on the blame assigned to the opposing group. For example, instead of seeing the problem of vandalism as youthful misconduct they assign blame to an entire ethic group. 2. Equity Theory: This theory views conflict from the perspective of social justice, where each group perceives fair resolution differently. For example, one community may feel that they are not receiving or are restricted from adequate public services while to another group these amenities appear readily accessible. 3 .  Field Theory: This perspective views people's actions as a product of contextual forces. The forces are those impulses that are performed and those that are not performed. In the case of Northern Ireland, many Catholics are frustrated over the benefits that Protestants have received for their loyalty to Britain. 4. Interactional Theory: This theory views conflict as a process of ongoing negotiation about what is valued, how behaviors are interpreted, and the meaning of events. As Levi Strauss stated, "People create the situations they perceive, and what they perceive is also influenced by what they do" (Isenhart et. al., 2000). 
The ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland is a common part of every day life and it therefore dictates what residents do. For example, instead of using the most direct route to walk through a neighborhood in order to access public transportation, a person may walk another mile out of the way to avoid from walking through a community not their own for fear of harassment or physical attack. 5. Phase Theory: This theory is described through the series of events that develop over an extended period of time. Though scholars argue on the name and amount of phases that occur. Three common aspects are agreed upon: conflict proceeds through a predictable sequence of behaviors; behaviors that instigate conflict can be identified; and specific behaviors perpetuate the continuation and escalation of conflict. In the case of Northern Ireland there is a clear sequence of events that have shaped the dynamics of how individuals interact and perceive their environment. 6. Psvchodynamic Theory: This theory goes back to psychologists and social scientists such as Freud who believe that people identify problems from an internal subconscious state ( e.g. anxiety, ego, fear). Based on this theory it is believed that those involved in conflict will engage in compulsive and repetitive acts despite the knowledge that such behaviors are counterproductive. This is seen each summer as Orange Order marches take place throughout Northern Ireland. Many of the marchers hold positions vital to resolving conflict (i.e. political office and public service), however each year they continue to march through Catholic communities chanting blasphemous slogans. 7. Social Exchange Theory: This perspective of conflict is viewed similar to a market analysis. People make choices based on self-interest; they weigh options to determine the cost of actions. Under such a theory, compromises as a set of trade-offs are the most valuable tool. For Protestants, the fear of sharing power and losing control is too much of a cost, and therefore choices are made to protect their security. For Catholics it is equality. 8. Systems Theory: This view takes the perspective that there are units of an interrelated system, which influence each other and function within a larger system. Three categories describe a system breakdown: transactional redundancy, a subsystem becomes ineffective, and members of a system exceed their roles. 9. Tranformational Theory: This theory focuses more on change and process than on explanations of how conflict occurs. This perspective accounts for the dynamic, changing quality of roles, relationships, and expectations and the 
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environment in which all these exist. This is· evident in the ever-changing dynamics of the relationship between the Catholic and Protestant communities, which are perpetuated by a series of changes in governmental structures to protect their own integrity and control the larger population. (Isenhart et. al., 2000) As indicated by the number of possible theories, there are a variety of perspectives of how and why conflict occurs. The focus of conflict can be identified by the way in which individuals or groups identify themselves and/or others· within a given situation, as described in attribution, equity, and interactional theories; or conflict can be viewed as a series of behavioral actions and events as described in phase, system, and transformational theories. Together, these theories provide a broad and holistic understanding of the various directions and associations that conflict can arise from. With this in mind, steps to combat conflict from its most fundamental sources can be more readily achieved. 
Strategies for Conflict Resolution Ellen Raider and Susan Coleman (1997) developed a sequence of conflict resolution models for an International Negotiation Training Manual. The format of this manual is geared for training in consecutive three to six day workshops, however these models also work well incorporating into the planning process. These models provide a coherent system for achieving resolution that if paralleled with the planning process could provide planners with a framework that would supplement traditional planning. Illustrated below are the models used in the training manual, as well as a description of the functions they serve. The next chapter will describe in further detail how these models can be incorporated into the planning process. 54 
The Conflict Resolution Continuum: provides a means for achieving an overview of the conflict by examining existing attitudes as well as formulating a general strategy that will determine the appropriate method for procedure (See Figure 5 .1 ). There are several functions that this process can serve: 
1 .  It establishes who the stakeholders are, and the existing attitudes they have to the current problem. 
2. It helps to create a baseline assessment to determine strengths and weaknesses. 
3. It helps diagnose discrepancies between what is perceived and what is actually being proposed. 
4. It provides consequences of different approaches. 
5. It provides a vision for the project. 
Negotiation: is the process of problem-solving through collaboration. Through this process disputed parties exchange information and identify common problems and interests, and develop solutions that have mutual gains for each party. Part of this process requires that each party seek beneficial trade-offs and compromises. "Effective 
< .  
Avoidance 
I 
I 
I 
I ' .  
Avoid 
the 
conflict 
I 
I 
I 
I 
< .  
Denial or 
escape 
If your general strategy is . . .  
Assertion 
/ \ 
/ \ 
.... ........ . . .  then the method you will choose will be to . . .  • • ,< 
Negotiate Mediate 
I 
\ I 
\ I 
\ I 
': . 
Arbitrate 
or pursue 
2rievance \ . . .  your focus will be on . . . I 
\ / • 
Needs and 
interests 
- I 
\ I 
Rights 
I 
I 
., 
Litigate 
I 
I 
I 
• > 
Aggression 
I 
I 
I 
I I • > 
Fight or 
wage war 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
• > 
Power (Source: Ellen Raider International, Inc., 1 997) Figure 5.1: The Conflict Resolution Continuum Model 55 
negotiation depends on the ability of parties to share information about needs, issues, and interest" (Deutsch, 2000). Table 5 .1 compares the elements between competitive and collaborative negotiation elements. 
Competitive to Collaborative Re{raming: Figure 5.2 serves as a framework to understand the elements of negotiation. This model creates a reference for distinguishing the needs of each group and how to reframe conflict from a competitive position to a collaborative one based on understanding and acknowledgement of underlying views. Once needs have been identified, they can collectively begin to be prioritized through a series of compromises, the "bargaining'' process. 
Mediation: is the process in which disputes are resolved with the assistance of a neutral third party (See Figure 5.3). The objective in this process is to help opposing sides find acceptable solutions to their conflict and "counter tendencies toward competitive win­lose strategies and objectives" (Deutsh, 2000). Mediation is not the solution to all conflicts. Eight elements are identified for determining the use of mediation: 56 1. The parties can identified. 2. They are interdependent. 3. They have basic cognitive, interpersonal, and emotional capabilities to represent themselves. 4. They have interests that are not entirely incompatible. 5. They face alternatives to consensual agreement that are undesirable. 6. There are existing interpersonal barriers. 7. There are existing substantive barriers. 8. There are existing procedural barriers. 
Table 5.1 Competitive and Collaborative Negotiation Elements Competitive Collaborative Positional Discussion Interest-Focused Discussion Forcing Problem Solving Intimidation Arguments Based On Merit Devaluing Others Valuing Others Win-Lose Attitude Win-Win Attitude Information Hiding Information Sharing Personal Gains Joint Gains Self-Focused Empathy and Understanding Self-Interests Joint Interests Power Over Others Power shared (Source: Isenhart et.al., 2000) 
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Twelve Stages of Mediation 58 Stage 1 :  Establishing relationship with disputing parties • Make initial contacts with the parties • Build credibility • Promote rapport • Educate the parties about the process • Increase commitment to the procedure Stage 2: Selecting a strategy to guide mediation • Assist the parties to assess various approaches to conflict management and resolution • Assist the parties in selecting an approach • Coordinate the approaches of the parties Stage 3: Collecting and analyzing background information • Collect and analyze relevant data about the people, dynamics, and substance of a conflict • Verify accuracy in data • Minimize the impact of inaccurate or unavailable data Stage 4: Designing a detailed plan for mediation • Identify strategies and consequent noncontingent strategies that enable the parties to move toward agreement • Identify contingent strategies to respond to situations peculiar to the specific conflict Stage 5: Building trust and cooperation • Prepare disputants psychologically to participate in negotiations on substantive issues • Handle strong emotions • Check perceptions and minimize effects of stereotypes • Build recognition of the legitimacy of the parties and issues • Build trust • Clarify communications Stage 6: Beginning the mediation session • Open negotiation between parties • Establish an open and positive tone • Establish ground rules and behavioral guidelines • Assist the parties in venting emotions • Delimit topic areas and issues for discussion • Assist the parties in exploring commitments, salience, and influence Stage 7: Defining issues and setting an agenda • Identify broad topic areas of concern to the parties • Obtain agreement on the issues to be discussed • Determine the sequence for handling the issues Stage 8: Uncovering hidden interests of the disputing parties • Identify the substantive, procedural, and psychological interests of the parties • Educate the parties about each other's interests Figure 5 .3 : Twelve Stages of Mediation 
(Continued) 
Stage 9: Generating options for settlement • Develop an awareness among the parties of the need for multiple opinions • Lower commitment to positions or sole alternatives • Generate options using either positional or interest based bargining 
Stage 10: Assessing options for settlement • Review the interests of the parties • Assess how interests can be met by available options • Assess the costs and benefits of selecting options 
Stage 1 1 :  Final bargaining • Reach agreement through incremental convergence of positions, final leaps to package settlements, develop of a consensual approach, or establishment of procedural means to reach substantive agreement. 
Stage 12: Achieving formal settlement • Identify procedural steps to operationalize the agreement • Establish an evaluation-an-monitoring procedure • Formalize the settlement and create enforcement-and-commitment mechanism (source: Deutsh, 2000) Figure 5 .3 ( continued) 
Arbitration: is the process of third party intervention to recommend a contractual decision. This tool for resolution should not be used until both negotiation and mediation have proven unsuccessful. The best conditions for arbitration: 1. Parties are deadlocked after an attempted negotiation or mediation; 2 .  Parties will not have to maintain a relationship after the dispute is resolved; 3. Legal issues predominate over factual issues; 4. Parties have dramatically differing appraisals of the case's  fact and how the law might apply; 5. Parties have a history of acting in bad faith in negotiations; 6. An immediate decision by a third party neutral is needed to protect the interests of a disputant. (source: Isenhart et. al., 2000) 
Further Considerations Theoretically, the process of resolving conflict seems self evident as do the practical tools; however there is no escape from uncertainties. Human behavior is 59 
unpredictable. Therefore, it is important to consider the barriers, limitations and hazards to conflict resolution. Many-barriers associated with effective strategies stem from competitive and destructive behaviors. For example, if disputed parties experience a sense of being over-powered a breakdown in communication is likely to occur. In addition, if disputants feel that the problem is too complex then they may lose interest or motivation to participate. The possibilities are endless to potential discursive actions; therefore practitioners or third party facilitators must be prepared to simplify and/or shift direction in communication at any given time within the process. Other potential barriers include lack of correct or sufficient information, political obstacles and funding. As in any situation of conflict, safety should always be given consideration. Those who take leadership and third party roles are most at risk because they challenge traditional ways of thinking. Though in Northern Ireland the risk associated with resolution initiatives have been relatively low, the potential for harm still exists. "Leaders and authority figures get attacked, dismissed, silenced, and sometimes assassinated because they come to represent loss, real or perceived, to those members of the community who feel that they have gotten, or might get, the bad end of a bargain" (Heifetz, 1994). The realities of change can provoke passionate emotions and resistance. "Knowing how hard to push and when to let up are central to leadership" (Heifetz, 1994). One way to achieve this objective is to facilitate challenging issues over a longer period of time, while achieving less objectionable goals in the short term. In this approach, communities are more likely to be tolerable of change. Most importantly, being conscious of behavior and patterns of change is the most cognitive skill to possess in order to insure one's own safety and the safety of others. 
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Chapter Six: Planning Principles that Support Conflict Resolution 
Conflict Resolution in Planning It is clear that agencies and professionals in the planning field have a vested interest in resolving conflict at the local and regional level. Urban planning, thus far, has been criticized for its lack of investment in anthropocentric issues. Planning agencies throughout the United Kingdom are technocratic and centralized in organizational structure. This is exhibited in plans and polices thus far that have concentrated on technical analysis in making decisions. Improvements have focused on rebuilding image. This has been appealing to middle and upper middle-income residents who benefit economically from investment, but it has been proven largely not helpful to the majority. Furthermore, planning has been ambivalent to the built environment associated with conflict. 'Peace lines' restrict community access to basic public amenities and the development of social housing lacks any variation in design. The lack of social consideration has enhanced class division, failed to stimulate local economic activities or reduce poverty rates, restricted access to public amenities and services, and further divided the large ethnic populations. From this perspective, these problems have unnecessarily sustained conflict. The organizational problem is that Northern Ireland is notably different from the rest of the U.K., and therefore traditional planning practice is not enough to ensure • successful urban development. There needs to be a greater commitment on the fundamental social issues that have largely shaped the urban community. Conflict resolution not only builds stronger relationships it builds stronger communities. If 61 
planners were to incorporate conflict resolution strategies into their plans they would be more successful in achieving goals and objectives. The illustration (Figure 6.1) below is an example of how planners can incorporate conflict resolution theory into the traditional planning process, which will synthesize technical analysis and anthropocentric elements to create a holistic plan rather than one laden with one-sided outcomes. Figure 6.1 represents a feasible framework for which to incorporate conflict resolution into the planning process. The inner circle is a model of the comprehensive planning process. There are five basic steps represented, which include research, goals and objectives, plan formulation, implementation, and review and revise. This model also illustrates that planning is an ongoing process, and to be effective it must flow through a continual evolution. In order for it to function effectively, all stakeholders must be identified and equally included in the planning process. 
1 .  Research Phase: A fact-gathering phase that enables a planner to make knowledgeable decisions. In this phase opportunities, issues and assumptions are identified and made. 
2. Goals & Objectives Phase: The phase where data is analyzed, community goals and objectives are clarified and formalized. Goals and objectives are often revised several times before being officially accepted. 
3. Plan Formulation Phase: In this phase, alternative ideas are pursued to determine the most feasible means for achieving goals. Scenarios are developed to determine future patterns. A plan is then formulated based on the best alternative. 
4. Implementation Phase: The phase where the plan is put into action. 
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AsS&rtion 
(Source: Author, 2003) Figure: 6. 1 : Concentric Model for Conflict Resolution & Planning 63 
5. Review & Revise Phase: Once the plan has been implemented it can then be evaluated based on measurable objectives. The objectives help to determine whether the plan is meeting its intended goals. Adjustments to the plan can then be made accordingly to improve the overall performance. The outer ring represents the appropriate resolution strategies to be utilized during the planning process. It is divided into six sections; assertion, facilitation, consensus building, negotiation and mediation, arbitration and evaluation. These sections are based upon the Raider Conflict Resolution Continuum Model (1997). Each of the six tools are located within the planning process at the phase they are likely to have the most beneficial effect, however it should be noted that they are not exclusive to their specific location within the model, and may prove to be useful at varying stages in the planning process. At the core of this model, the innermost ring ( see Figure 6.1 ), is the central component that represents trust building. Throughout the planning process, building trust is central to effectively achieving the plan and building the foundation of stronger relationships that will continue to grow as the process is repeated. 1 .  Assertion: Located within the research phase, it is the medium between avoidance . and aggression (see chapter 5 Conflict Resolution Continuum Model). It is the starting point for determining the appropriate course of action to achieve resolution, and therefore part of the discovery process. 
2. Facilitation : This is located between the research phase and the common goals and objectives phase. Facilitation during this initial stage in plan development helps to identify common problems and interests between disputed groups. The Raider Competition and Collaboration Reframing model ( see Chapter five, Figure 5 .2) 
64 
provides a framework for the communication process that can help to achieve effective dialogue. This could prove to be the most influential component within the process because it is at this stage that forms the foundation of effective communication between groups. 
4. Consensus Building: This tool is located between the common goals and objectives phase and the plan formulation phase, where third party facilitation is critical. At this point, the planning process begins to engage the larger public. This is the selling point, a chance for the practitioner to convey the benefits of the plan. In addition, it prepares the community for what lies ahead after the plan has been implemented. This is the time for readdressing concerns and effectively restating compromises and joint gains. The benefits at this stage are the most significant in the planning and resolution process. The more consensus and general acceptance of the plan the less negotiation, mediation, and arbitration are likely to take place once the plan is implemented. 
6. Negotiation & Mediation: This stage begins after the plan formulation and before implementation of a formalized plan. This is the most sensitive phase in the planning process because it is at this stage that behaviors are most likely to change as ideas are challenged and decisions are made. Without negotiation or mediation, communication can quickly become competitive and the entire process runs the risk of failure. Planning professionals can act as facilitators to redirect and/or refocus the direction of communication. (See Chapter 5, Figure 5.3). 
7. Arbitration: This stage begins after the plan is implemented and before or during the review and revise stage of the planning process. The amount of arbitration that 65 
talces place is determined by the general success of the plan. Arbitration is when third party intervention is needed to settle disputes when both parties are in "deadlocked" disagreement. 6. Evaluation: The evaluation stage is simultaneous with the review and revise stage in the planning process. These tasks help to determine the strengths and weaknesses of both the plan and the process. The purpose is to identify areas of improvement that can be more closely monitored in the future. Again, this model indicates how conflict resolution can be incorporated into the planning process, and what objectives it serves in addressing planning related issues while simultaneously bridging a relationship between groups who are formally opposed to one another. In addition, it brings communities into the planning process where they formally had very little or no input. Planners are able to address social concerns directly and apply technical analysis, which further strengthens the legitimacy of the plan leaving less room for criticism. Finally, planners will be able to move beyond marginalized planning and talce educated risks with trust and support from their local community. 
Planning with Conflict Resolution in Mind It is I to assume that significant change can be achieved within a short period of time. It is necessary to start small and build upon the foundation of successive achievements. An inventory should be talcen of current conflict resolution initiatives and forums talcing place. Suggested by the number of non-profit organizations working within communities, the public is ready for a change in the unstable condition in which they live. Cross-community initiatives have already been established to facilitate dialogue between disputed groups. Following the format of Figure 6.1, there are 66 
planning initiatives that can be used to facilitate a shift in approaching conflict issues. To begin, planners should survey organizations and individuals already engaged in the resolution process to identify commonalities and societal goals, as well as members in the public willing to participate in the process. Once the planning process has begun, forums of communication should be opened to representative members of the public. This can help identify common concerns and non-traditional leaders to facilitate dialog among planning professional and their communities. In addition, channels of communication should flow horizontally among planning agencies to minimize disconnect between multiple projects. There are two recommendations for achieving this goal. One recommendation is to create a unit within each agency that participates in a larger unit responsible for communicating among agencies and the public with a specialization in conflict resolution. The second recommendation is to hold an annual conference for community development and planning that is specifically designed to address Northern Ireland's situation. Planning professionals, academia, politicians, community members, and other members of the public would have the opportunity to engage in conversation and learn of current initiatives and/or research to further promote planning with conflict resolution in mind. Further action can be taken by selecting symbolic projects and incentives that addresses common concerns and have beneficial outcomes for both the Catholic and Protestant community. During open forums, participants can be encouraged to provide input into possible alternatives, solutions, and incentives. While it may not be possible to initiate every project or program, it would identify those that are appropriate for immediate action and those that could be achieved over a long-term period. For example, 67 
eliminating a 'peace line' at an interface area that is relatively low risk to both communities would have multiple benefits. It would create access between currently restricted communities and public services, open the possibility for generating economic activity in locations previously unfeasible, and symbolize to Belfast and Northern Ireland that it is reaching an end to an era of divisiveness and conflict. Finally, shift marginalization away from planning and redirect it to extremists. Strengthening the collaborative voice of those in favor of resolving conflict will send a clear message to extremists that destructive behaviors will no longer be tolerated. The only way Belfast can succeed in marketing itself as the 'City of Culture' is by building a city and a nation based on peaceful coexistence. 68 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Conclusion The purpose of this thesis is to gain a better perspective of the role urban planning has in shifting from conflict management to conflict resolution. It does not presume to prescribe a solution to conflict in totality. It does, however, describe why urban planning agencies have a vested interest and significant influence in the process of conflict resolution. The result of a violent history shared between Catholic and Protestant ethnic/religious groups has deteriorated any trust between both communities and public institutions. Many technical complications that urban planners face in Northern Ireland are directly linked to strategies that attempt to cope with anthropocentric problems. As a result, it is difficult to resolve issues critical to a successful planning process. Northern Ireland practices planning under the same guidelines as those established for all nations in the United Kingdom, and many planning policies are established through one centralized government. What is good for one location may not hold true for another due to varying circumstances. Therefore, planners in Northern Ireland must move beyond traditional practice and seek innovative techniques to be successful. Incorporating conflict resolution strategies into the planning process builds relationships, and therefore opens the way to new planning opportunities. Furthermore, for the planning process to be successful, change must occur in the centralized organizational structure of planning agencies and in the planning process. At this writing, the flow of information between planning agencies and the community is highly restrictive. Community members are hesitant to establish any trustworthy relationship if information is subjective to their needs. It is critical that information and 69 
communication flow in both directions. This can be accomplished through policies that articulate a collective community voice. By empowering nontraditional community leaders as facilitators between their community and planning agencies information can flow horizontally back and forth between groups until all parties are satisfied with the final results. Decentralizing the government's role in decision making will create a positive step towards gaining public trust, which is at the core of conflict resolution. As indicated through this research, the socio-economic dynamics of the population most acutely affected by the confines of planning are those of low and moderate income living in and around interface areas. These communities suffer higher poverty levels, lower educational attainment, and poor housing. In addition, these locations are divided by 'peace lines' designed to minimize conflict between opposing communities. These physical barriers limit access to essential public services and economic opportunities. Inter-community and cross-community programs have been established to promote awareness and acceptance of both ethnic/religious groups. Some organizations go so far as to resolve conflict between communities. These arenas have made a substantial effort to bring conflict to an end, and the public seems generally receptive to these efforts. Logically, planning agencies are well situated to establish relationships within this arena to further promote community development while concurrently expanding the capabilities of resolving conflict. A shift from technocratic function in planning to a community consensus based approach would ultimately create a shift from managing conflict to resolving it at a local level. The most predominant and challenging planning strategy is the creation of 'peace lines' (Murtagh, 1995), which have divided communities in the Belfast urban area in an 70 
attempt to minimize sectarian violence between Catholic and Protestant ethnic groups. Ironically, this has the potential to be the most symbolic initiative to bridge successful planning and conflict resolution. Targeting a 'peace line' as a community development project could have profound implications no only for enhancing socio-economic opportunities but also as an example that peaceful co-existence is possible. Following the model in Figure 6.1 of .chapter six, a collaborative multi-agency and community consensus based project could be established which would bring everyone together in order to define the future of one interface area. Members of both the Catholic and Protestant communities could define their joint needs and concerns through negotiation and meditation, while members from a collective representation of agencies could guide communication through their own areas of specialization. The end product would be to create a collective co-existing community. During this process, new innovative incentives for the interface community could be established as a reward of accomplishment, as well as further community partnership and act as incentive for other communities who want to participate. The process is designed to start locally and grow nationally, and as it does the issue between national territorial ownership increasingly becomes inconsequential because the residents associate themselves more within a co­existent community. Ideally, Northern Ireland becomes one independent and collective nation based on internal resolution. The city of Belfast has indicated that they wish to promote themselves as the 'City of Culture'. It tried to do so in the past through redesigning its image, however plans did not take into account social considerations, and any attempts to implement this vision were criticized openly. Though, if Belfast was to incorporate an image based upon 
71 
resolved differences it could be more freely accepted as a 'City of Culture'. This idea could then be sold globally, and Northern Ireland could promote itself as an international center for peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Belfast, instead of capitalizing on the 'terror tourist', could create an industry around peace building, functioning as model for other contested communities in the world today and in the future. Revenue generated from such activities could go towards funding for a local resolution incentives program, therefore communities reap the benefits that they sow. 
Further Research This thesis has examined how conflict resolution strategies can be incorporated into the planning process in Belfast in order to resolve problems associated with projects that were previously design to manage conflict. . It has only examined problems associated within the Belfast urban area, however conflict extends into rural areas of the country as well. It would most certainly be more difficult to promote the same strategies in such remote settings. An examination of how to incorporate or initiate a strategy for conflict resolution in these areas would be beneficial for providing a nation-wide agenda. This study provides only a brief summary of the socio-economic demographics of Belfast's interface areas. Further study in the spatial distribution of ethnic population could highlight areas of demographic change and the areas most in need of housing, which is one of Belfast's most immediate concerns. In addition, indicators could be appropriately identified or created to determine the most feasible 'peace line' removal project to initiate. Such indicators could include but are not limited to per capita income, educational attainment, household demographics (i.e. age, size, gender), ethnicity, crime, and health. 
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Finally, a financial feasibility study to determine the cost and benefits of implementing a planning project proposed here would be advantageous. There have been extensive studies on how 'conflict' has generated revenue in Belfast, and how the middle and upper-middle income residents have benefited. The reality is that for resolution to occur, the monetary benefits must be obvious, or those who benefit from conflict will create rifts that hinder the overall success in any resolution-focused project. Meeting these complex challenges and achieving a truly integrated society would provide a quality of life that surpasses the expectations of the citizen's of Belfast. 
Hypothetical Example A hypothetical example of removing a 'peace line' illustrates the functionary purpose of the model in Figure 6.1. A 'peace line' is a symbolic form in Northern Ireland because it is a constant reminder of the conflict between the Catholic and Protestant ethnic/religious groups. The Cluan Place 'peace line' in the Balleymacarrett community has been chosen to be removed (See Figure 4.5). It has been chosen for several significant reasons. First, it is one of the smallest in length and therefore economically more feasible to remove. Second, it is located in a community that is 60% Protestant ( see Table 2.1 ), meaning that there are a significant number of Catholic residents already integrated within the same community. Furthermore, there has a larger female population within the community, and as stated earlier women are more open and accepting of the opposite ethnic/religious group. Finally, as illustrated in the religious distribution map on page xvii and in Figure 4.5, Balleymacarrett is located in close proximity to downtown, and is visible location for a symbolic site for conflict resolution. 73 
In the first phase of this hypothetical planning and conflict resolution process 
planners would identify inter and cross community groups as well as nontraditional 
leaders who were willing to act as facilitators between their community and the planning 
agencies. Next, planners would identify key support service providers within the area 
that have a vested interest in the process. These providers would include but were not 
limited to schools, public housing, waste management, fire and police. During this initial 
research stage, an inventory of the community' s current conditions and socio-economic 
structure would be conducted. This would be accomplished through voluntary action 
groups, who were representatives of the community. This process is key to building trust 
and expanding perceptions on issues. Participants would be chosen based on their degree 
of knowledgeable about their own neighborhoods. Nontraditional community leaders 
will seek information and in so doing will strengthen their relationship with neighbors. 
The research by planners and the voluntary action groups would provide a 
foundation to begin the process to identify common goals and objectives. The planning 
agency would arrange for a series of charetts over several month starting first in 
established segregated neighborhoods. The public was encouraged to attend the meetings 
to discuss their needs and concerns. As neighborhood strengths and weaknesses are 
discussed at the charetts, the facilitator will direct the discussion to similar discussions 
recorded in other neighborhoods. Participants will be asked to identify common concerns 
and goals. Eventually, groups of neighborhood representatives for each side of the barrier 
will be asked to meeting to discuss their perspectives from their side of the barrier and 
identify common issues of concern. The exercise would then be extended to compare 
perspectives from either side of the barrier and define a set of goals. 
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Lets assume that citizens ofBalleymacarett were able to identify three common goals to be considered when removing the 'peace line'. First, improve the standard of residential housing along Claun Place. Second, create opportunity for more commercial development within the surrounding community. Finally, improve security within Balleymacarett' s residential areas. With these goals and objectives in mind, through a second series of 'nested' charetts, participants would be divided into diverse subgroups and given the task to formulate alternatives to meet the assigned goal and objective. A planner would be assigned to facilitate group discussion, to clarify jargon, keep the process on track, and mitigate perceived differences of opinion. Lets also assume that the groups managed this process well and were able to formulate a number of possible alternatives. Each group had a chance to present their ideas to the rest of the participants, which were challenged through a series of questions and comments. This then becomes a foundation to create a cross-community association with local planning agencies to begin to set a specific agenda to address common issues of concern and define steps to achieve common goals. A key is to build the trust by taking viable steps that result in tangible results than can symbolize the possibilities. If accomplished successfully than the 'peace line' can be replaced by a vibrant commercial district or public park, which symbolizes the interaction between both ethnic groups. 75 
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United Kingdom Public Records Office Release: 
Public Records of 1972 
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Public Records of 1972 "On 1 January 2003 the Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew released a number of government documents under the 'thirty year rule'. Some of these documents were related to events in Northern Ireland during 1972. The documents are listed in chronological order. " "Following the introduction of Internment on 9 August 1971 there had been a large increase in the level of violence in Northern Ireland. Violence continued to increase during 1972 and by the end of the year almost 500 people had died making 1972 the worst year of the conflict. 1972 also saw such events as : Bloody Sunday; the end of the Stormont government and the introduction of Direct Rule; Bloody Friday; and Operation Motorman." (CAIN, 2003) 
E.&. ,SECRET 
f 
• llet.. A01005 
PlUME MINISTER. 
J!9lfflc5 lHueat t,tte•-PJ.Fty<D!)sp; 
The �: ... ttl')t«!,@�;;-� •ftlf ·� ·�� •� �  ll'�_. tq tu 
1•�• ""1uch th• �"-',�,�� --•• r,�uv�: fl'�m l¥tr-♦,, �-�: ._. 
Sir . Har�y Nichola• ',�t :�,��- 01" :tb• pro�� �•• !I&. Ot11Mipul'• 
letter - •�ply •ab: toi- c:.�..a.tl'Q,11 that thtly .oul4 be '!open-
.
onded ••• ��,. 
Sh ;lln'"V NlcbQ•• -•i: @,-. �-::iltb- th,a.t mt"r�nt 1• an bnpedbne.nt to 
dl,
. 
•u.c:cess ·:� . ..-r ��.tt�l:} •• Jli,;;
.> The Oo
.
ve:rnment1e ,.-ep1y shoul'1 
,��-���· :�.�--,tt��)���:�,:�f� �14;:.,_c ••� :��t'- in tbe•
. aensc · of 
. . . . : . - -�_, :,.:::: - .. _;-
. ,. . . 
. , . .., . . :,�:- .· 
. -: - . 
. ,• . . . . . 
.· ,
. 
,_ 
� wJ.tbout ��wtlc:♦ �: ,i,IQ19ut conun�tm«mt ·Ql'l the }1ff
.
t,of any of the 
pu-ttctpmu,.. But •� -�t: not •
d
d . that ddtl :mean:a, eo ,Ar\·;&a itlt
.
e 
.Gov;ornnsot:¢ are c�-IJ.MI� •t)Jbet,•:<�� �-a� q"Htlo,n ,�; -=n.dina 
lnte<rmnent tU\lla��• �j". so,. lona a.a violen_c� por•li•Uia ? 
Z.
. 
1f iu>� lw:w.e;'liv . the piroapecb (o
r 
tho t\\l.kJ,
. 
a:ro ·not bdgbt. 
Dr. Pa.i•ley ha" •�cafM';'.�J:
.
1"-t .,n1 ·not
·
ta1te ;1,•t�i :1f,�•:m>a •U 
,, ·  .
. 
_y
·:· ·· :. ,: ,::. �. i · , ,,_ /_'I' � ' , 
. 
' : . ' . . _ ·->
.
->-: 
... 
\ .
.
.
.
. :··\;=". ·. 
·, " . 
OA the actmda; a.ml•• �4"-"plto, aoJ.M recent bav•·- -,. Mr . Fltt. lt 
aeeme. ,.fairly cleQ; th.at-,the :$l>LP :wiJl. �ot ,a:r�ikt,t'U Jh• �v.-nm-,,�t 
.•&lV that 
.
u..,- ;��� ;pr♦�e4 \�: -�,· .. mtei-mne�. nt, i:l! :lt.Ot �"-•••�tty 
_AA �•tt••� :"-.� .. !� :�, �,��� ... a:t t��,t:; 1n. ::tJa• · •�t •�­
,•tnce puhU.� Clpi�fl•>�flik,
.
� t-o ... ee tbat the Govornii,.ent Q011l,cl �-�; ,  
looae a Jot of fl'W.lm• ._
. 
ter,:of£at• - _
.
etur.n;tor: no,.:more than ·• ,.,..otid.ae 
me.,-ely to take pa
.
1."t 1n inter...�ty -••·· wlthout any ant.ttattce diat they .-ui 
,)lava .a •�cea.«ul outeo�.; �i'.i: ���� �t jl�-� lt
.
.U. 1• properly 
�sad (� ♦�•ii 
.
• a t,".::"&,�--.•� �- -• J•* '�:on the •ti•-1&�: •pt• 
that the ArM�, "�ee,m;� be  �.�n�g:,� •ga.tn � .. ,��;;��,'o,,:•r UJ�,JR.A,
.
_ 
tha Ooritrnmtmt r#�: p-oba:bly at'for4 to rest'1 h:i thtaipo•ltlon at leaaUo� tho 
tbne beblg,.. 
3. But it 1a not:,.a
. 
Jona-•te.rnt policy� 
.
a-4 eoone:r· or lateJ- tho· Govemm.ont 
-.ill bo ctrtv•n to �Y �1_1� .... ,• •�• •�• ��� ��•�,:whj�h �-• 
bet""' pro1Pf,-ta :
.
f# �cflie; � 
.
J4tc:�¥;-• . .._._, �/ ••,pt-••t OMJ�c-
. 
I 
&re we c-,.onl ,;�• old dil•� •i•� � :new ittitiative be baaed on the 
•. fun· · · ·. 
dame
.
· 
. 
·
.
·
· 
.
. 
n. 
·
:ta.·
·. ·
·
.
1
·
.p
r
·
.
·
. 
· ·
e
·.
· ·nd·
·
· .•. 
•.
·
·.
· ·
·
••
.
·
•·
·
• •
·
·
·
·
··.•• ... • .. 
··.  
.
. ·
.
· 
.
.
. 
tba 
.
. •.· ..
.
.
. ..
. 
•:t
·
··'
·
: 
.
•
.
. 
· 
. 
. ••
.
· .
. 
• 
.
. 
·
·
.
·•
.
·•
·
·
·
··
• . ·13o
. 
•
•
·
·
·
·•·
·
·
•
·
·
• 
.
. 
·
·
·
·
i--·.
·
·
d
·
·
·.·' .••�r 
.
.• 
· 
·
·.r
·
e·· .
·
·
·
.
·
m . .  a·. ·.in .. •·.• a
· .
.
. 
·.•
.
·.
· 
.
.
..
. ·•
.
inta
.
·
·.··
·
·
.·
.
·
·
• .•
•
.
... 
-.
.
.
. 
-
.
.
. 
· 
.
.
. 
· 
•. 
•
.
, 
.
. 
· 
.
. 
• .
.
. 
� 
.. .  
· 
.
. 
t .. ·•
·.
·
.
··
·
·
.·.a 
.
. 
· 
. ·n.
· 
. .  
·
d• . ·
.
:•
·
·
·
··
.
·
•.-
.
· •.. 
··· 
.
.
.•
.
.. •· t 
.
.
. 
tb .
•.• 
· 
.
·
·e·
· .
. ·.
S ...•.
. ·
·
·
·
•
·
•t
·. 
o 
.. 
·
•
.. 
r
·
· .
. .. ·.
m·· .
· 
.
·
·
.
o. 
·
.
n .
. 
t
. 
•l•t6m· co�.e•; or •,bomd U .._ri•,ageY•otne •bra•k:: m94W�attM ID
· 
tho ..•• 
a■-umpt�<? lB�rto.- �•ton, •v� J••• •-t" D• �· not·'bo 
.·· poHible �· �.o.,,i:,���,(�·�
. 
wl� #'.f� .. :t��'.-�t ·�.� �-�ti�!'.: 
:01>vunlr.Mj�• 
.. 
•• . u,� �••••, ••�• .•,:� i.-�..it,, .. �:� .,�!{��!:.:���; · · 
. ·..;,gt 
83 
84 
E.R. 
• ThiJe azgmnente.-JMI'.� � 1��--- (qj-;�j�ay; e.bd X i•� that �il'ii•tez■ 
wll1 �Obtinue to witli �.• f� •�f-;_�� �-maill,.-12'1$',"#;'�: �mont 
ayatem U at all poaalble., 111 Jt po•�ble to do :..o· in •••entlal•, �lail., 
taldni a n.ch(, initiative ai the rJ.&l.lt �om•t? 
··" tn thh. � ::i•:����� iftJ,�, .M�,. :�ty ._,..,; 
'2'KAllllJJY' •�-yo� (Mr. M�. ;�Ufi!•: �r �(-4th �•;.,•,• •n � *'� (it•s•�> ��- tq the rc.,ot ol ttt♦ .-u•t �. it • ., •.. that 
,� -�•W;;�!•-�:�:•:;.·:
_,
�•-� . . . :\�:t _.p,, •• ._a�;�.--. . c;-•�uc: 
popuktion Will he • f�e\bl.l(":
·•.· •
:
•
:·
• >/
', ; ·,,-J{•�41'� � ,l'�Or.-. 
Catholica -� 4o ;1"Qt llell•""' �l-•,Ae �- uo de.fM-4 t._torms 1 .  
111'Ul•. ton�.-. ·?(� p�ondu• c,i> •••tu-�•• � .. <.���f ... ·.<>f •if". 
#:tm• �;.o acc�� dla \ . t•i9f'.;m• .,,.it.ton:t�;,li •nreJ.yid♦ -� ,, ,. . . . " ,  ;,,·, . . , -� •, . , ,  .. _ . . . ,., , . ... , ,, . ,'; ", · , .
. 
, . . , ·· · , ' . .. . . .. · .. ,. · ,  
:·:::�-==:��:=;��1=·� 
.. .. ·on1y :way O! d.-monstr•U11& till• .wolild be• tf(� o! legislation at 
W1 •t1Pb\•�r . pqtffilJ .tit,-tt.d1J<tfe�i:.-..f th� authprl� d tlic United .Kingdom 
Par�:niat blf!Jwxl the e�&•�;. �----•�49 tbe �Jnt� of tho logbla.Uont 
-�: Commltt�t• cU.e�u:.11ton :_f;P•�· ♦f.(�)·t' anc1 a oq11!,tb �� : 
:�•ia••tetl that -� attempt to r�etrlbute ��nt••·facfl.-.;�(�: 
traufer r.eliponail>W.ty for .  law and order to W••tmbllte� would\"w ,�• 
to lo&'lti> Stormont •o .� .. J�•��e pow�r •� �l.l .. ity 'U..1 
�. V•��i� Ci<)ver$�Jit ��ttau ·.a¥· ·!'f1 •��-� ��:· .. 
�: met>* pr�'Cl�t,n� tbe .ttuatirn, wh\ch ·w.,.-••-•>�0 �\��-..� 
Bllt._.th• now m•���:-en• '�,g:�-�o-1 -��vie•� 'tp �otec�1'�! .. 
Minority" (OEN •t(tl),, ,tt�U,1.l*�-- --�·,20••lble altetnatb1e appr�h -
, · , ;"/:_ . , . , - .... .. . . -·-•:··, ···. - i . ... ,,..: : .. . .. - - - ' 
. , 
1 .. e. lop■Jatioa .at Weatmmat r a�rameamg to tho Catholic �ority 
.a: .. z.,aaom\ble ehar.e in l"cprH�•t1on not �y bi :�_Ul,t"P,@t,.:�t .. i.a -tJi• 
���-- -a.m,f -�Ol"P•��I: ��,g cl�Jij'tl, • •  to, -... t its �--·· 
&om beina t'.r,utratt' _.,llijt �j,r'�. lt. 1�/��,--#,::c•c�'/�(•1.U:& 
'l•_··N-t· 
· .. 
• latiOA'• ,Jw.hu .. tur-:.,'.����:�;_. �- · : O\'ls� aaf�,;.�� · · : the 
---- , ,  
. 
---a . . · ,, . · ' : � !""
.
;r,, P.' ' ; •  .
. .......... ��-:-• �lty ••atnet 'tadmbdstra.ttve�• dlio� tt<>n<o�'.I�' /b,.J':.F:•qilbltlf·. 
;tWtt a. cer1-"1 n�r of- po•ta -on �le �l#llOl'i� ;��{be i�lld: � 
ca�Jic:• and �� �'.�:-�' ��-•�••·· ,AAd - tbe law W�·: Jieed 
jt •:JW••¢1'1� wrr· -.�i:N�· J@� '�"·i�.,. �ea�1a � •��• 
,j�'.�t•. 
s� A •t•tem :or this· kind wowd tn.volvt·'.•ome a�cstn � 
authority ()(. tho Oovor:llfflOZlt al.St.monh ani; l(wo-cil;� c��o,�• 
�,-�� But;o�r �-��;·M� .. ,l>e:., ·drty•, ill ,1-i circumstances , 
E.ll • 
• 
to a4opt .. le.-. �'ti.al•· �; we- �••�-,e•:,a,e :p,ro�--• toJ-.v.e •ncou.-•.•: 
i�: tbb 1dlld oC ·aotud� - �♦•la; ancl ·� �torrn,ont ayt;tem �-->•�h could 
et Uhoiitm••• - u �t '°•,i'1•• therefo:re, ._t, if th• ',Qo�at •atd 
p,iblicly that ·mi.rmnetat ·� ac,t:._.. ed.ed •o tong .a.e 'Violence :per•i■ted but 
that. · lt' v.toleace c:ea■ed;. they �
· 
be.·:PH"'red,io c_.:w.. �� 
intft'llffleiat •.i •eo. 1,e•i.�:--.·a.e ,a� UM••· ��a_w �-·•m11• 
be •u.ft',lc� , ''.�  � ,�.,, Mr. �, . ... �,: .�•• IIXtl'',�; -��­
to. accQt �· 4 • 
. . •• ct"� · ot•·· iwrdmt :�-� lt �\,oE 
coar�♦* · ._,.:.:;r�s,�,� a=�·�;� � �;: •�.�:ll�t 
Wms;· ,but, ·,U it w•'• Ort .
·
��. ot PJ••�r�,a-�- .;�ui. :��int:-4 
a me c ti.. ; ·d · . ofa · ·· . \, - · ·· > ,' · , ·,,, /· . .  · · < . . i ,. ., · . ,,:. >'., Q . . . . ... • . .  �- � •  ���w., . ... , .� 
a pri�" "'�tlf.'.�. Ii �.�-�t t.,•�::,� 1\0; t.,� ,-���- �: �tl<t.�, : 
ln· th•·'. .. ��)#� �n- �'.pr��-� �r� � �.•·�'.':: 
6.. . If th�• . i, �tin/._ .. •uatUoo• .,�Jo�,...•.',�t. ,lt would ·'-­
.oi-tl(:4w�o���. ?!�--•��n:la �N:.;�1)':�� ����.� c1raruns 
a llW)(wldch··#·o"bec:•ettheiJ••d• £>•� :� .� -·.them) imt by 
pro4Q�fua �o � p;opo.al• �r �tel'• to:�:u�' ¥�e,uy 
di-aftiaa oi l•�lWO! 1!4'P! hl·�,. � tho proj�ct .'�"1, OCl turihff 
e�mfniid§t to
. 
be ·�th� I ff � ·�,t�ef�,,.9U'f 'lo CO,Wicier 
how .nd when to J.auch' lt .
. 
.-,1 bow to obtain f<W it tho JWLXtnutrn �r •-..pport, 
in. the South no l�1• :t1uu.1 in the NOl"tb. 
7. For the �••t, 
.
. lt •• •uo••� by Mr. llolwbl �c.).ej--C�k .:.t a.  
tn�i'With th� F'o,r♦!p S�i-�ry befoi! •. ·�·� - i�t !h,r• � 
·
·bit: 
advantage', 1Ju1n a:-tJ#11�.�.4ebate, in •�cb bf';:�:'�t·• �o�d '.f?z1tl�t�• 
the Govermnent·or ,thtfl\.911'!,11.ic: for it• �e to co-4?i,erate �. 'denyto.J th� 
IRA a ■de ban lor o,-.�-
.
., At that tlme:�ou were .�poHd to think 
am yQu �· � .. �t m,the pre�ent ·p>Q:t c� ·clJ,m&� tit Dttb.lm �- �e (.. t.• . .
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.of Mvantaae for,:dl� � �8 ia m fa� o� df�,uad�g �-, <;h:'ffM!t�t�-
' 
. 
�It &o�(•,� a ·••�ttt,. 
I. Flnalty __ .under .tJwl head ther• fJr:,tJie qlieciltan ot ibe,:Qcwv.nmqt�•· 
Hply to U..,@H--tbat·'1-•�ken •l"afH4'«--��- �•r- � �uman Rights 
�� ,, ,la �''tig ·,.,..? 
. c+ · . ;,;· , . .'•,. , 
The Sec;Q!ilt &if:u!tiop, 
,,.. The'��•\wql � to � .. t1M �.X,;�e.M!�, tipm;.-
. 
cc-a � 
nlaticm to �--� .• , .. '��zy �. the Btx�. ;,� ��'• 
·
·� A'eedecli cm 
, . · . .. 
· .
· ::· . . _> . · ; )·: . - �· :· __ _ . . , .· _  ( :<-
... , . ..
. 
:_. - -�'.- ._-·:_-- . <-''·, ..... · . ,;=, · : __ ' th• wm.owal .� tJMt;:,... :oa- i-:ac•••loa•• which ,tut••·\t9'.-,t�.•-;•• .--tit 
:·' - ... , . 
;;>;, 7Jtf:�;·: <. �--�::,::�\, <s
.
; ,� ·,�--y � ' \: �·;,:d {�--
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•�
-
�--�"t-_;·�,) �1:; .'.. - - >;�,: �, . - ' �• .. v� 
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Thia tho\lld ��: JHt' 'r,;r.newed ac' a.nd  enforced? ni. Hlatlvely,ta�ntlo 
bandling ot the ·a;ntf...,intff� maroh: .on ·Chl-1-bna• -D•yr11PA•· p-,1'•P• 
to " cc�••d ·by the -�e{�::� �o�c••d.o-.. B�. >if: � �� fd�I o. 
�6' � Mi-. ����••f:�Yl:�, we c��t:��-�·-�•�· �m 
-b4�it.Jy,;·t�f:i,J"5���,u. ta.Hie, ij,: ... J;g}� skw•• to deal with 
pz�c•,�;� lnttnudatton • .. . · 
:�•·t,.__t .. Vthr�..u;,��-· t)io 
l'lnglta4et• of ••h ��h•�• �� 'to .�. pr°'ec�,.i9{,#if-
·
�,, 
:of41tlJ.j. · (la � � �-;. the &•�•-' :��'� ·�· �,.-�iiia��� :­
. &,�-,�� ..,,. �;.��i'.e�� :���,: :��:,«>��:et, • �.a.ft.� -to cle�l 
::�.:�� ;'�Xl¥�..-:�)�:-�'.���� ••·\t�• .�:�G:: .., J;· �: .. ·1;�; the 
,80lcUer• •houJ.••� '
f
U;, 
- . 
· · .  • .  ·• . :··., <tx>•. /· ::-
.,.�
t 
J()j, $uw-1:� neri •-tt•UOG:"" 
(a
)· · 
Ar < · · ,y:, : 
1
' ·
. ...tor<' · · '. · ✓ • : '·: c ·ouun· .· ·  · · · . · :toi:,la · · :' :' "0 • :'' , •• .- ,. ' • • · '  . · . .• .  u.. .� . ��•-•. ,� . ....... · .. • ��· , . , ��-� �  
ijle.ts:' �u•tocty -��•�t':�i&iic�,ili�:�18:� ::•� •:.·;i• ·•. ._· •-�• 
t( •eareptla•\� ·•�� &m:g�otta �! �nftbe le.e ? 
(b) . Cut.,u�emen,tll be maute .for �e •��bf:llta#�� •ot;tho inter�ceQ ? 
l wide.r•tahd that Ge.neral Fcttd _pat .tbe PQbat � � 4� ,:� . .  �:,� 
Belwt befo-re CIU'Je't:cnae. :(But �t �ocut lfr�b��*' tn ... '? &j 
♦h,"t. t() _pa:y f�tAtJ. · 
(o) Hp�fdij1� •tan4 OJ;1 �;ove�nt. 1D t1;re lnt.6,�t poc�e/l 
The No.rthern lreland �rnm•t have �.r11.um&r oH_wopoealuajdv 
c�•;deratiPD, h,cl. the auQ••t1on;:�(tJuv�p,-J.1t t#bunal ahould 
ngt:. only b1t. �4td,i�:t� �·.�·"' �::�dual• aljpay, ;��et.t•·� 
-•� a.t.•().iba.t� s,. tone'.�� m,:ouabt ,��;�:��{� �I'�: that 
·int•�nt ordv• •J!i9'1� �, mad• u a z<,s\;llt of lts :r-ec ommendatlon• 
z:a;� than timply oo �• rccominenda:tfon of tho RUC.  W•::8"lher that 
thia, particular pr.oposal (wbl<:b orlginattuJ with the. Attorney •�.t, ot 
Nortk•�n'. k,.lan4. but •�• die lMd.>.efit O, 9��t1<>'A 'Wltl( hi�i 
�ESE��r�ii:F:i� 
(cl) ' 1t we can t1c;eure a lull ln 'J�o.'� ,.���• lt w9UW pto1-bly = =�=::,�:-:«::�r�:� �; 
the �.�:�J;:\�y. ,B\lt I.ti• ��:-�J: th• le•• �;�ll!;��p.t '.-� 
E.il • 
• 
� �ed ... n hi •av�e mp.-.._ ,��; -"� �·-•t�!•!� 
ac)i;; cu. be taken ciw.ckly. · Tilt. thi• la,wldl·:� "••ar.e•�•,r,:_� at. 
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TOP SECRET 
CABINET 
CONFD>ENTIAL ANNEX 
CM(?2) 5th Conclualcma1 Mbwte 3 
Tlmreday 3 .l'emrauy 1972 at U. 30 am 
Cepy .Np. 
!} 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR. DEFJJNCil ,aa:14 that tho Army 
welcomed the Inquiry wb!ch the Lord 'Ch1e£ Jutico •fli,f ... paad. 
Lord Wldsery, had •sr•ed to undertake und.er the '1)db.-nal■ of 
Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 Into the cventa fu l.rmcl••# on 
Suada.y 30 January. Jt waa to bo fea..-ed that ... toua• at.01'der•• 
with a z-Sak ol a "1rther loH ol llf•• mta'ht Z"otNlt bom th• marche• 
pl.aimed to;tab place ln .nd. around Newry OD Suactay 6 Febl"uu,y. 
Condnpllte fron) l)uadalk, which lay close auo••· the Border, wea-e 
!mend� to take part. The dl•po•ltloae •• by � aeevtty fOl'cea 
mvolved ln thl• case the Royal Ulster Coauda� .(Aue). whom it 
had been impracticable to deploy 1n tble·--way · ln  Lon.donrleny; the _ 
Ar--, would be �ept In roa01'Vo to covor polnte whkh tb.e RUC might 
not be able to hold. 
THE PRIME laNJSTER, •urmni.n8 up a brief dl..-:uaalon, •aid that 
there mlght be advantago in en•a.1'1ng tbat it waa more 'Wic:wly Jmown 
that. aa tbe Lord Cbancellor had alroacty lfl!ormed tbl Hoaae of 
Lords, it ha4 been Lord \7klgery'• own propj!Hal that he •hould 
concJu.ct the JaquJl"y alone. "1'11ia mi.pt bolp to foreatall any 
••sa••tlon that the Government had appointed a slngte lndlvldnl 
1n ordo:r to avoid. t:he poaelblllty of a dlv•pnce of 91ew. 1w:h as 
had aria.en 'between Lord Parker an4 Mr 1<>hn Boy,1...Carpent• MP 
on the OQ.6 bud and Lord Ge.rdfDer on the other ·hand durlag their 
ecent luqalry !nU\ the procedur,oa a�S ln�ogadon. 
Lord Wldgery Jltdpd that- Id.a· own .l'nqmry waa elmp1y 1nto queetfone 
of factf ttaat he would be able to :forin an opfAton by quadomns eye­
witneHea wlthollt tbe need for expert • other aaelataJil:;e; and tba,t 
he could coaclade the Jaquiry more q� If he conducted it •Jc:rn.. 
The Roman CatboUc, resident. of Lonclondnr,, might not be prepUed 
to co-opuate wfth h1m. But he would 1-v• p(M'Gr to emn:moD 
wit:ne .. ea sub poeu.; · and it could not bo �•YIM..,,. ara-d 
that' the Lord Chief J'utice o£ Englazlcl �. Impartiality. As 
to the march•• plumed hi am a.road Newry, it wae desirable that 
e.ery·tnODfltftce should be brollsht to � to pr�t their ta1dna 
place. He had. hlm8Glt' written to the B.oman Catholic Arcbbl•hop 
l 
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of Woatmlnatu and to the Roman CatbOllc l>l-imate of All lrelui4J 
and HM Aml>aJIIAdor 1D hblln was do8".rln& a par■onal meaaa.p 
to the Prime Mmleter of tbe lriah R•publtc� Mr l.,ynch, aaldn.s hlm 
i:A ��ular to cltanacte cW.eu ot tbe l\opublic from lllda& .. i,arl. 
Tho Ca'bbutt • 
I. Took note. with approval. of tho Pr� Mmlatu1a 
,u.,...na • ., of dda part of .. � dlKiaHloa.. 
THE PRU,4E .MINISTER •a.Id that the Northern Irolaud Prime Mlatlitu2', 
Mr Faulkiaer, had been lnvlted to London to cllecues tho polltlc:d 
altua.tkm. on the follow.:l.ng day. Thezie wero reporte that Afr . . 1'rnch 
and ·tba leadeH of tho Fino Go.el and l.o..bo• Partio• la the B.Qm>lk · 
might &leo � to come to LondQQ to _,.et; British Mml9tere. It 
•w.:b a requ.•� wa• ll'ii&cl• &Del c:c>llld bt d .. med to be for tbe pu-POfe: 
o£ •erloas dlecu.etiloh r•ther tbzt.n. miere propagaJlda. 1, wouJ.4 be, unwlile 
to refuae. Jt .,.. de•S.•ble to lowor th• polWcal tension m the 
Republic� U po .. l'bla, putloQ].u-ly ht view of Mr Lpch1• precarl.cu 
poakion and the abaen.ce of any n.cceHor who could exert -a 
mod•ating influence. The 9ltu.tlon was being kept under c� 
review by tho .Mtnieten principally Ctc)11Corned; ill particular poHible 
fot"ma of p()litlcal lnlUative \Ml'• bebif ouelwly appraised. 
In dtacuae1ora there was g;en.eral •Fccment on the J.mporumce of .. 
maintaming e. broad base· al auppo1!'t la Great Britain fo.r the 
Oowi-auneat.t1a pollcy. A growlng He.tloa °'" pub1fc opiD1oo w:bhoo 
to •" British troop• wlthdra'W'D from Northern J:reland. lt wn• 
aomottmee fol"aotten. howevu, that the Anny was the Armi.r �J 
the United 10.naaom and waa not opej&tfas In a. foreign or colonlal 
territory. MorctOYOJ'• to tbroaten �awal mlsht cz-eate a,n 
expec.� that th� Goverm:noat1• t:"oeoludon wa• w-oakonlua» whUe 
to cury ft • c:Ollld �y renlt In extensive bloodahed m Northern 
Ireland, In wblc·h iw· Romu1 Catholic clement o£ the popaladGri inlpt 
well be the ma:.tn .a"uera. Be!oro the Ar"iffy aarrison could be 
reduc� to a •lam£1cantly lower 1avel an acceptable •tate ol. l&w and 
order would have to be reetored and a eatlafactory polJUcal , ..... 
ment woul4 need • be a�'bleved. �thele.H, in order to i-,tain 
a t.oa.d m,oa.aure of puJ,1tc --.port lor tho mamMmaneo of luge 
snWtary l-.c•- 111 Northern lrelanct. it •• de•lrable that movement 
toward• some politlcal •<tlution of the conllict •hould be Meil to be .In 
�o•pec:t. It was auo probeble that t:bere would be increutna 
lntorudono.1 preeaare In favo• of a Polidc;al lnUiatlve. 
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llBSfRICHD 
Dft)Sl0/44/41 ;. · .. il.tCTED �: :  . . .. ··•�, ·· 
':' ,.�;. • I }>. 
. ,"l\, ·.� ?l!ta&t ,OtJR!tl!!. tltp@IOI · IJROl!: MO Pal u .:ma • inc· 
Ipoidenta cl;rg;1ng the paat 24; hours 
t�,t activity· VBS at a COJDpt.N..tivei, hJ8h l�l throughOUt 
the �(:e vi th a concori.ed b<>mbin&. · . o,mpaign by. the IlU. &PPlU'Oll .. • . .  tly ' . ' . 
4eaipe4 to 1apNQ8 on the Catholic · po�•,10� their ct·,tentma tion 
to con'tinu .. the c� ot :rl.,olel)Oe . 't)lero was • iota.J. r>f 24 
bomb •x»�oa1ona• end a further five boaba . -wore ctehaH by Amy 
41#,po,-:;t eSp1rts . 
2. 18 ot �• ��b •xploalone were 1n the ru.ral. a.r•·as. !hey 
�ol�e4 .� bo.b at'tack on the Coun.ou OttJ.ce <at lfewry, where a 
ett�1 t1 ..-n vu $b9't ··Ui tb.• leg•; an expioaion i» a· derelict 
house near Q��. in -�bioh thl'De aoldie:ra � alightly 
inj1J%'ed; an attack OD eletricity pyl.one· near C'ro�� and an 
add.itiou :tQtW p·the,r bomba vere 4ef'uaed b7 Art'JJ:1: boab c1.1oposal experts . 
,. there were three exp1o·e1oms in Belts.et. '!he Stnith1'1eld Bue 
station was :ext••�  �cl by a 50 - 100 lb bomb; a car hire 
fira 1n Groe:veno� Road vaa al.110 ee:riouel.1 damagod by Jl 100 lb bomb; 
e4 ,a 15.: ll> bOJD.b e,aµad a:r1nor �e to the Be�,m Hotel ,  Dunrl'nirey 
A' malio1otaa �ire at tho tln1'Vtre1 ty Air S� �114Ung in hl.!ast 
cau.ae4 four cbilian casualties . a !bla1lb b011b� �· a c:ar in 
Qoi,,·ora"if>n. s,reet , was d,eal:t with by a. traine4 a�41er fir� -a 
�arl Churttav ,anti,-tant. rocket vi.th an inert warhead e.t the � und•r 
th-, SU:t>O"tf1pn. .o:t a b.cmb' 4.iepoN.l. expert.: th& first ope�:tioJJtd 
u,,e ot tbia tecJ:m44,ue ancLa .o�a,1d.era.ble aue:ce•• Onl1' ten .»- ·Qi,nt 
of the ·5()" l'b �88 ap].QtJed, .9auaing very little ·· 4amage , the-
other 90 pe� ca,it. being &CIJ.tt�ff harmleasl.y . 
4. �ere . wero · three dploeiona in Lo.ll.4Qtlderry , �ough no casual ti ct 
�eta tGcl• .  
·5 . !her• ·were 14. ao�,1ng incidents in the Province .  In, Boltast 
It • - - � •  ,-,.it.,.��:: 
/t.roope 
9 1  
• 
92 
r� ·�t �EO 
·- _,,_ ; �d:Y,�� 
t.roopa were fired on three tillee, retuned fire once an.cl opened. tin 
on a 6\,UJmaI1 once. li1 one of the inc id.en ts, a soldier vae -�111h�1: 
:lnjued. In Londonderry thffe vero a1�· ahoottng tncidenta at the 
aeourity �orc:ee.  Ptw was returned twice and it is believed that 
II • , ·. " · . 
one gunman was �t. Th•r• •�e tour 8hot>tfll& ia0:1dfflts 1D the f\1%'8.l. 
areas. h'oope W'•r, ft� oa . ,hree tiua, OJ1ce �m aci-oaa '"1• 
border near 0-affiaiozi. 99--• hnaanash,. ln. the 1<aurth '1no1d.ent ·· an 
ex-B s"o1al was ·tµ-e« on uev -Rewtomhallil:ton but was not injured. 
6 .  othei-- 1Do1dmta in. the Province tnclmed :a peaoetu.l cletao;n.at�-, 
tion in Belf'ast l>y 500 bot�atant W<NI._ outside 9·r,.uidil,\ Gao1 -� 
the releaa. ot tntemee•. rw:o wanted arr�ate Velie ma.de tn:- �faet . 
There vae the � llooltsan :actlyi\f' 1b l>oth l3eltut and t n 
The" were three a�cl -�l�ert� ·fn the �- ve.as. 
?. Joumalista at th, �pa Jfo�-1, :�-t; hav·• befn told that 
.,,, �, ·- . � 
at tvel.ve o • clock -,()day at, :irhioh. an illportant announcement ia t.o·:te 
llad.e. 
:'"�.- ···-.. -. --: 
:�; -· • , • : sRP .·a .• ;rgsmAL_ 
fllM$'> · _  J9flSJlP, 
rw, 2(101}:� . <:Q� 
;•0.,. .t'i'W,. 
:ii t, Fa �iii· thitt 
we en not 
!t��h\,�"�l:":◄r,�f 
t W lcota ··cwt· :l.tii'r-f >I- .·-: · �;-.->( '· >'!i'i"• .:. _ .. ,::f;.'8. ·. :�. :-,,... • ��i/., .·"tf;.rr_As 
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RJC0RD. OF. A .?BI.m'HCflE. 00. · NVBRS.·· · . · ·. . AT.ION . ..... . . . ·· ·.·.· · :��ffl!R PltllS .NINISTBR CP· tfammRN IBKlitOO) AHO·; mB PRIME MINI · · -
AT 4.15 : p�m. 00 WBDNESDAY 15 �·1-w2 ,, 
Greetings exobanged. 
I!Jl.... Tne situatf'on is toot we be.ve now Naehed ·the 
stage wt1ere • �ve carefully cQ0$1� everyth.tng 
yc-.., nave said to us aJXI • nave done . a  oaplate review 
.af: our own .PQS1tion and now we 'WQuld 11� to .go _over 
it all with you �n. And what I was 110�erif4l was 
wnetner )tOu ·:oould come ove.r here -on W� :next week 
wtncb �d �ve .us a onance ,t(r:g,t, 9ur �et QUt at 
the way.. 'ftlen we could spend a � o.r as much ot tne 
� .u 10\l ¢an spa.re gQ1Q8 over uie tmc:tle gtteurxt. t 
don't know whether that ·would fit in witb your plaas. 
IC, lt Yes 1t would perteQtlY. It v.ould help me a lot 
- I don 't know wtlettler 1t is. possible - if you can g�ve 
me aoyt.t11ng 1n wr1Ung btfo.re that so that I can prepare 
tor YIJat l am  going to \al� about. 
l:!.L. Well,  we did oonsid&.r that. bee� 01' .tbs nQt,e 
111 your own l$tt,er to me.  Am we .realty telt that i.noJ-8 
was so much 1'.ran the point of view ot; tbe general P'->ir:rLs 
tm,lt 1s .i-eallY very dJ.tt1°'}lt to put gown o.n a ,P1eoe 
Of paper. 
ll!a Jr. I l.@eratam U.'t. 
E.L.. And the other thing is lWhetnar". again in view ot 
�t tau. sa;id 10 your last few wQl'(la, lVbetner vou- ,t� 
llke to bring one or two people witn ,oo. 
J,W, le I wOU.ld 11.ke to tbiuk abou't tbat,. Would _yc,u 
actually WNtt to come to (l,8:Q1�J,,..uns that- µav :ror 
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immediate announce.ment? 
.fal.. Vlell . I alwars said tbat we would have 00Mult.at1ons 
with you beto.tte we timlly set-t�l+;Kl anvthing tor announ.ce­
meot . So l was �· this as a good • going ovei- the 
gr-ou.nd ' • It rat.her depe�s on where we get. to as to 
whether there -.are. dec1s1oos tor announcement 1-d$atel¥ 
o.r not.. 
Mc, Fe Well, you see , provided that we weM not actuall.v 
goiag to reach t.tm oonolusiona and anoOWleing toot d¥�.· 
I wou.ld not be � oonoernod . .  e1�tier about having aQlttlilng 
1n adv4noe •O� about briaging anyone Vii th me. 
l!.JI.. It 1s .r�l:i, Just a . .  �est1Qn as 'tQ wbathe.r- you 
ttliilk it wwld be helpful tor you and ror 'them, as I 
shall nave tne nDl'f�l colleagues with ma . 
14£, la It migltt well be ,  but I would l1k& to think 
about -�t.; 
.f.dia.. Well, Will 9011 turn 1t over. am tben .fW can let 
me know. 
Kr, E, Risht. 
E.Ji.. But they would b8 very welcome • 1t you would like t-o. 
Mr, F. Right . 
l!J4a.. Tben I tJ:w'lk pe.rhaps i wrulc; like to say taaor,n,w 
mo.r� at our usual time tbat vou wJ.1,1 be com1ag. 
Mr, F, Yes . tin you announce that I am c�. how 
would you r,llrase t,nat - fC1I! :cotlSllltations? 
l!J4a.. That ls rigbt. Well, we w111 go ahead on that .basis. 
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0A the iawtructiona ot th• Secretary or 8j:ate l ut :representati"8 
of tli4I . ProvloioDAl IRA .at 3 pm on �•uiclay, 20 J'un.e. fh.e •etlftl 
took place at Ball.yanett:, a · h01.11Je near tbe Dono.pl bordft' Olffl8Cl 
bf Colonel M �. JlcCortell .  the Colonel ancl. Hrs McCcrk•ll ... ,... 1D 
the houa• at the UH. 
2. . :,._ .:llA- ·�._._.._iiJMD � DaY.1.« <>•0�1:a. .,.a 
b ,�., -., l: •.. , .. �.:� )y Jii Pnak ·:11·1�. 
ii' 
, � . letoro � Uucni1u.d .. ou proper started l waa intro4iAco«l to ,,•· third perion, Mr P J >tGCror1 who . "8a cles�bed u a solicitor 
an4 a whollf il,4epeadent person . It bad ·bffn � t'b,at 1 
sboul4 �arr,- 111th • a note aicned by the Secrotary ot · Stt.t• to 
oaY that I wzu, an nuthoriaed :ropro11ontative . Thia note ie in tbe 
tollcnr1ng teraa: 
"The. boat"ff· ·or th£!, note, Mr •p. :1. •�.i«t � a 
aeiar official. in .,- Department. :tr, ,._ fDU 
authority to. explain m
y position 011'- •• ·t11.ne .,..,.t• 
which ban bNA .. put to ••• 
Be \& Millt:,�M lfr· ttr st .  1e, another ottioial 
tu. 117 �. · 
(a�) Vlll!ea Vhi telaw 
hcn- <if 8t..i• 
tor fort� bvlu4• 
•r llcGNrl7' • NDctioo appeared .. to be lo ■crutinioe this .. Dot. ad. 
·l>)- �. ot hi• legal pm,ua 1- pl"OllO'Wlftll ii au ... tto ..._ t'h• 
wltJadl,ew. 
4. Ve lepa .4i ....... tJltlt. • •i:a�f •hoa . ate "1t11Jt� fll• 
poaitton . ·ot tM· Proflnou.1 ·m . u ·  to the hmttar., ot. 
St'ate wldc)a WM . M fol]JMU 
� IRA 'ltff& i>repnrod to call an indefinite -e&ase tire 
tt they coUld be atistled that tho Secreta?J or State 
11oulcl e.cc�t tbo dmumcl of ce:rt-t1.in. conv icted M"iOOftON 
tor "poliUcal atatua• a that he would iuodiately' order 
the ceos-ation ot aU. ·� ot th♦ IDj aucl th&'t 
bl would bf> pr�p� attu the .--.··. tire hacl ·� ebovn 
to lie ot:reoUn to � Nprea._.ti.,._ or the Proviaional 
Jill. 
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5. They did not 41not� -challenge the •CC\U"&CY of thia aa 
.thctir position. ·� �o . the apaoltio mttna which tbar ,raie: d I Nii that the 8NrOtary' of State coultl a()i ·.� 
tbo demand. �or political. .tat. f"or convteto4 priaonora. 
Quito apuot frta. ao.r oth41- con.aidor: ti,ou. thia voa not • 
concept JmovD to ·the lav and tho Sectetat,'� ot State could. 
tharef'Ol'e \ DOt $ive etteot to it .. H• vu hOlife'ffr preptwod. to 
c�ider reprao♦ntationa troa; lffl:I' .. quarter about apecUic 
· tt;on atrecting the tTM:hent ot priaonors and had 1n taot 
a1.Na41 111de cert,ain a1'1'1UJBementa vhi� WIINi aut,tieiently 
'satiatactory to tbe priaone:n th •'l••• fj� tho.a to have 
call.a otf their huna� •tl."ike ff .. a been. ann.Olmoed on -ti. 
nen. I auggeated that th$ nbatanc:e ot what vu bct➔.ng asked. 
tor '11114er. thjJ! bead. vae Yirtw.slq tho 'poaition u it now waa .. 
6. llr 0' Co�ll 'n14 that ho 'bro«41:, accepted thia , but 
there na a doubt •• to Whether the npo:rt that- th., h� 
atri.ke had been called ott ,... -true . Be ukad il l wou1d at 
once telephone the OO'femor ot B ltPt Prison and ulc tor a 
naae4 pria0t1tt to CO'llle to the: telephone to pv• a penooal 
� to Mr o• c�ell on eetber or not tha hunpr strike 
hit4 � callod. of�. 
7. I poiatel out thd it ha4. )MNrA � that Otll' •wt!ll&' 
ahCNl.4 be ecmpl•t•l.1' aoctret -4 •t ror • to do what lie 
aake4 w�4 ,oalllle· «ii ·  ' ediato lak and that thero vu no 
prospect tat.· lie' : vould be able to pt . th• Oovemor to lsrJ.Qg 
the pt'J.■Ollff to the telephon to t&lk to Kr O • Connell-. 
8. I then tuiu4 to the eecOQd qll♦ot1 •. Vhich had bee 
put - :Lt' a ceaae flro vo:tte -�ed •<,alt 11m 8QOHtary of Stata 
atop the ban.a••'\ or the OD&l DA. I uicl '11,at 
hara&811leJ;l\ -.. • "nBUO t�m · and aeant dttf'erent thinp to 
W'f� JGQ�. Ht.or 1• ot "ffflOI\S example• I 
aaid. that 1t •••e4 that lthat tbe W1.> :roprc3ontat1voa WN 
Alking ro� DJJ an asaurqcG that: th� aecurity torc_s vould 
not tak• the opportunity .of a cease fire 'ti 1)1Ck up aea llb.c,­
they had been lDl&ble to get ell• the cam,-ip •• on. 'lh"I' 
aereed tlult tbh' •- · their p0ait1on u4 I oti.id tbat . tbe 
Secretary of' Sta,te vaa pl'oparod to gt.w an 3,asurn.1u:,o on this 
p,oin't 1mi�h would man that raid • sea:rcb and a?'Nsta _\o 
look for p�ple wanted for their past activl tiu would not 
take place., '?hey raised one o\i.'boidiar, point : -- --� 
ot thou- organ.1sat1cn remtn-4 1n tear or. beinfr a,tao1cea ac 
ha4 been a.ecun tomc4 to cU'J.'y'ing concealed ri.de•e.rllils. It 'tb• 
� atopped an4 to-4 te>_ be CV17in& um voul4 .,,., • 
urested? -1 _,...� -.t tb1a 1ftUl a quet1ti® w.lticb I wo.al.cl �• 
l>aek wt �- -• .obJao• .... to produce a aituat:lon u .MOB • 
p03aible vh• people llO lOllpr thau«ht tbey n-4,ed to .oarr, 
f irearu eml tl»Jti it penoM nre goi111 about an noralil. 
peaceM INS1D"8 t11-,. voul4 aot be·· 1nal>3ect to ar\itNJ7 
ot,opp1ng ancl HU'cb1q-40 
... 
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9. the third question which had -�• ,at . ,,... vheth«r ._. 
Soorot&r., of State vouU e,ree to a  -.tua ·. td.till repreaentaH:Tee attel" tho c:,ea.ae fiN • On tbie J aa14 tbat 
the ananJ:" WM 1eo but tb&t the Secret&?)' or State mat 
i'!Nlt 'be a&t:t:afiell that �e oeaae tire was ettocUn and 
that ho IIUBt be the 3Ud.se 011 ih.18 que11ti.on. Tlley accepted 
this u4 there vu· tboa a goo.cl deal o� baulls,i about -­
t$,il1t tb&t a genuine cease tire woul4 have to 1�at before 
the meeting took place.- Enntually wo satt1ed. -on ten dqa, 
the � trhi�h th• Secretary of State ha4 authorised M 
to �• to. 1 Nia that tld.11 pvicd ot ten days would n..« 
to 1nc;lud.e two v, ek.Uda but l c11cl not uke it o.n abaolute 
co:nditim. 
10 . I ha4 pr"1�)1 anmsaecl with Jlr Steele that at� 
these opening uohan,pa • voul4 'bri:nc � oiaowsaiou in.to 
the tom ot a llOl'llll converQation Jlitb the o'bJect ot dravfq 
out; tho IRA ropneentatiYM and lelptns eacboth r out it Ut• 
diacwsat.ou reachej nkvard. comen . At this point tbo IRA 
i-e�aqtativea began to ra110 a n•b r or other .aa.t'tue na 
tbo •�• becs.119 aoro Worul u Planned . On each of 
tho points. raised amt n.coraod ·below ve oxpla.inod the pu.bUcltl)T 
stated position ot BKG wlloff relevant , e=phaaiaod that ve bacl 
no auth01"1 t,y � . .-go'1ate, add we would accurately report 
thou- point• to S of S, ln�t ·that none of thara could be o.dditlonal 
condi tiono .for .· a CMM ti re . All thin thq said tbeJ" undo.-etoocl 
and, accepted. 
11. 1'h.e7 ask.od whether :._ e.aao :ru-e voulcl be tollowcl ra:picl17 
by the vithdrawu or the ·1nsy tr• Oatnoli� ano., part:1,:t.alAd.y 
in J1eltut, and whether t�ir . 'pcltr<>lling oould be ·Confined to 
in. road•. Wa nplied tba't ti\4) British A:ztmT ie not d.oployed. 
- on ·the etreets ot the ciUoa ot Northom Irelud becauao this 
was vh re ·t'.he Brittah OCNornmont wanted thett1 to be. Tho 
object VAB a ceaaation or violence and intercomunal . �oe 
lUld it tba t nre achined there wtJl4 l» no need. r., • 
penatmont J.:n:t p:rea co . 'rhe, did not dieaent tr•· t.ili■ -.t , 
said that if there could be a rapid :reduction !Ja · J.iV' aottn.v 
this would brin div1.dcmd4 ud. voula oNRte a ·ntt .. ataoepbeN. 
12. !he next: mtttter raiaa4 waa a roqueat tar the e&l"ly' releaae 
f'r= prisofl ot' one FO&l'd.neDt Catholic ( · clCee who 1 th · Boltut 
Prl.spn huns•r a trike) aDd. one or postll b
l
y -two Protaatan:t,.. fha,­
aaid tbat all tbNo ot these penon.s had 'been trAmed. Ve said 
that tbe ;J'equest ro%' .any re-.ui,r ot •011tence on tho t:rouncla ot 
aii,carr-iage of jwatice woi;llcl b conv&fed to tho Secretary of' 
St te but that these c(>Uld. not utters for bagaining nor 
an.ea in 1m.ich ttnY· early- dec.iatcm coald be expected. 99 
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1,. '1he nu. a-. aoa« u �u lfo� l:ielaa4 Office w"-14 
a prepared to .uait their good _ottloee �- ���o• tbea to 
npreaentatiwaot tho ·UDA. 'rhq cllt arly noogniaod the 1JDA 
u • potetat1all7 4e:n,o' ... _power centre irl lfortbe:rn InlaQil 
-4 implied that 11 a meoUii.r could bo effected the7 Jdtl,\t 
pt along better tbmt.- ·a_ome people WO\llcl expect. 
u. Ve en our •1cle ra1aoa· a _..bor of points 4H1&n04 to 
enallN that # •  ceue tua .. 4e:olare4 it aho\1l4 be 
etteo\:i:n. Pint •• tol4 them not to ha u:, 1-edkte 
an4 trrevo<;a'blo concluaione . h<m_ miJ' action bJ the. ae�n 
:force llh1ch appeared. to tha to -... contrar, ·t<J the Sepre� 
ot Sta:t•'a uaura.ncu. 11' the:, th.empt they are ·bcd-.r _ _ ·  
triokn ·they BhO\lld maket s-e41ate ocmtact •itb the I�._. 
lrel..dd Oti'ice and J)Ut their crtrn.noes cmd •att for Otn­
reaponao .. It the:, :reaaine4, cli,aaliaf-•4 thn would\ h.,.. ·'° 
,draw. tor -thelllBelvea tlm oo.eqmncea· • �enb,g io Yi�•­
actiri ty but it the.y , ..,_.. fibc.-. ·.· in ·tl\eiJ.;o desire �- a 
ceaa.e fiN_·an4 u ed � .toi�t. · they ah-1:Rild ·1n,t.· a«1cemed. to eiuru.n that it dt,d not ,tart -:qa1n by a msund.eatancli»« .. 
!hoy wlcoaed thie ancl .. � �� line of c,cmtact ( 1.hrougb. 
the -�orm,,,r ottice, ot the lJK. lbr�aentative) vcu1 arranpct. 
ftey va, • to mlY -th4'.t tb&7 would ·velcO\\!le local :,OSllb · of 
contact -� thety f'c,r theiT �· bnUovd tMt once tho ceue 
tire w: tieon ahown to· ·1t. pnuiiie they "°uld h o no d1ft10\lll7 
111 l.1aia� nth ·the A1f!l1lf ,'bT p0,1nU.cg o:u\ pHei'ble dmaer 
■pot.. ,�.,. add that altlac:n>p they couU ontorce a ceue 
fiN cii the p.art ot tl:ro-b · officers and olunteeTS they were 
•wrtecl about the Aotivi i ot tee aa4 school children. 
�J' a.clllitted tbat 'Yiol ce apinat th Any t'requetttl7 
.tarted.. "1 •� throwing by ahildren a:n<l that the opport\mitJ' 
vu thoa take1s to· ncala:to tb.e violenoo to shootinf; th�7 
off� to ,,u .· :it a list . ot places whfft! they ·thought . tllo ruk n.a greatest .,na anted . if tho A.ra, oe>uld avoid. tb.e» a.,, ·� 
vb� Qbildren tended to ecmgropta . .. Vo ropl1'id .that ar.r, •P•<tifio propoeal p;ienuinel;J designed to help Would bo "1'8:tullY 
ecmaid.•� tm.t that there could be no uncler·taldna that tlto J:t.,rq 
W'OUl.4 aiapl:, n-014 beiJIB 1-· uep,· l:LB ted by ·too IRA. 
lS . Ve mxt pointed, out tho danger 01" my pre-aet boob., trap, . 
A CUN· tire vould · completely wr&cked. if it were 'follove4 
b7 a booby trap killing Brituh olcl1on; it vould 'be. no 
adeq,11ate 4etace to aa,· that it ·1uta been. is, t beton the ce.ue 
t,iff. . Th-,. toolf 11ot.e ot thll i,oint appearing to recopiae ita 
toroe · wt· aot knowing• whether o.r not thet h&d any auch tille 
bala. 
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16. Vo tben lhli4 that a nuaber ot _._. ,� ' tbolr orpn.iaauo.n 
ware nl1 � DQ• cnlY . . 'b7 na.M wt 1r,
· aitbt• anti. that tho 
prospect• of tb• c.eue 1"1re leading to 'Pft'Mll•t po.• cloponde4 
vny JArgaly on theae people lying . lows w p,:e· one or two 
ex,m;los and they ropliod that it peoJlo .. of tbia· lc:ili4 .
vere to 
strut about in. Protutan.\ areas this woul.4 lie an aot ot 
provccaUon 
17. � ••�z:w Jacl now lut!ll•d. 2½ houra om Kr <>· Connell ..., 
Kr .wa..· t!:ie abd it' the,' · could. have a •hort period .,n tbtlll' 
OIIII. Wha ft ro3oi11414 them:· th.,- --.t o,er the pou.nd and cont'il!'DIGd 't"- ba•la on .  vhich tb• diaCWJaion hat token ·pl4ee, 
�ly that ve flN onl7 authorised. -0:opt vbon reterrinc to .. 
11M018 ptablic#lly eu.'tM poe1tion. to ®•l v.l-th the thne 
quoatiom, vbieh had b&en p\1t in. · adftDOe. to the S"retaq of 
StAt• . They ao14 Uult bl4Vi.Jig aet: u thQJ" wore JHll'1IOJ1&ll1' 
utie.t'ied that nere n •14 ve war• authorised to .� 
•xp�uly OD behalt of tbo Secre� ctf S•te VG weft 80 
autboru·e<t.: but other aeabera o:t theil." orpniutioa bo.4. aft: 
•t us u4 ..,. 8'J.4 ·tba t 1a the 'Whole context of Iruh 
hisior, 'tbej �• _'boun4 to f ..,- . that tbo7 miaht be being 
tdcte<t. Voul.4· ,U :qt poaaibl• tor the Sec:retn:, ot state 
to set out 1n:-.i-1tiDg hi.a ro�oue tQ the �roe queat1ou 
wbich bad btea put? Ve replied thai r� the Secreta:r.r of' 
State to aend ·them. &: letter of thia kin4 'IIOuld be politically 
who�ly 1-posaibl(IJ U vould hnv• 110 COD tl"Ol over tbo lette 
or \;ho •• Jlalle of' .it . . 'fho7 uv tho TAlidity of �ie and 1' 
_. rnmtuaU, pi'o� . tbat ttr McCrory who had _.. pre1e.nt when we first -.t sh-14 bo invited . to call at a eon••nien't 
pl� amt aet :a .,r.r!ttea tU,atemnt aigned by tbe Secretary of 
Si:at• co,ering �• 'th:No points, When ·tbe ·tlrroe p01nta wre 
cm� �in n.�rised the ntwence to the poUUcal pri•Ollff• 
had � dropped a.nd • nev ono 1ntro4\lCM - l\atJtf:1¥ •• 
"' liaison would. be Mtabliahtid. initially botw•on a ••r ot 
thn Seoretar.y ot .State• • aWt, and a repncentdive ot tho 
IRA . dttl tlus object or ruldJJB' the CMo• tire work- . As this 
vu .mi· at'ro.npawnt which tho Socretary of St.ate had inatna.cted wa to obtain if poaeiblo wo ll(ldo , no  comaent on tJae tact that 
it had ·  aow 1,.,_. a con41,Uon lJt 'the IRA to a oeu• fire . . We utd . tbat •• COllH ·not oaimD:lt, tb• s.,.U-17 of 'State to We 
propma.l t� ' ·vso Kr llcCroiy but that • vaul.4 .�iately 
OOlWGJ' it. iq b.1111. 
18 .. Vs tba bro.ached tm, <lwtation flt: the tbail't6 ct 11 cease 
tin. '�r �• Connell surgeatecl the veokend.. Ve empbasined 
•troz.slt tl,lii UJtPN ot tiolq� Mr 0 1 Co:nnell roplied that bl 
en4 lb.- .... '"r-o not pesent•'ee• and would h&Y• ,\o refer bad( 
end tat ... ,. W\lld n.ead som tu. to give .� val'.'111n« 
clova t:h• l!.u . lf• lfft'e .:aot able at this atap ·'° . get thttD to a,,:ee to at,ance the t:111,e 'bof a..� Fridq. 
mP SICRIU 
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19. l'iaallf, we aaked in mat terms the: cease ti:re ftlll.4· le 
mmomacecl btbg pAt"ticularq anxious tb:a.t .. it should not . ...  
'by inadvertanco , diacloa m7 ct the mttera whidi we -' 
beGQ diecutw.d.1t4. . !h�:y appuaftd ope to . ad.tee on tbia pot.at 
ucl 1 therefore d1ctate4 the fol101f'ing t�. ldd.ch kt1l 
ot tb.ul took_ do• and aa14 would be atJ.etact�: 
•ve are � -.n tndctiDi'te oeue fire to � 
etf'eot !roa • • • • •  • • u  in the contideat belief that 
the Secretary of State will -- • ncaptional 
ne)Omle to this nceptional meaave _. ho ha$ aal4 
he vlll do in hia public ota. t.Aellt&. tt 
a>. As ve vero about to le-.w.: I uked. Ill" O'Connell llba't the 
aise ad ccapoaitiOD ot the UA cleleption t.o moot tbo S .or S 
llight be. .Ho 1'riatled a little and. uict they could not accept 
an, dictetioo on thia point. I ui,.S. th4t the Secretary ot , 
State na :go.t.ng a long vay 1D a&rOM.11« to �t thoa, th4t U 
the:, wanto4 their nev •ewe to b& • wcceaa tbq ahoulcl hn:n 
reprd. to hi.a poaiticm and that it •�• be better no� to 
includ peoplo v
b
o W'ft'e well bov:a �•om and facea J lit 
particulu it vould -.m it :11\leh &di .r tt Mr McStiotata 
were not incl\lded.. � O 'C.onnell � • said -that ho could not 
entn into an �Iii .. to exclurJo him but added that be 
aipl or fli�t not •� .ia a tol'f,O of YOice vhiah suggested 
tb&t th.ffo .a ccna14.ral/la doubt; vbethar be vo.41  •· v:Uls.z.« 
to COll9 �. 
�1., !he ••ting bad l#IJted ,¼. hours. Aa � WU the ·fuel 
eae:ounter v�tb ·fibe Provi:Jipnal. IRA and aa .tll• IDoetiQ« to •. plaOI 
in an inlomal- en4 relu•d A' phere it -, �  ot intoffitt ' to 
i'eoOl'4 an la�-on. ot �- b'o HlJre8ontaUves vbo came. 
22 • . • Mr o•connen 1• a'biotlt. �  w Rr Aclal 1-: nent,--thr<.u,. 
l':be:M ·iii no 4out.t lhatwn- tliat -these ttto at :lean pnfUinol.y 
vanl. a oeaae fire· _ and • permanent ed. .to Tiolea.oe • .  VMtnor 
pre� ·u lo:nh� Irolincl ban brot.tgb.t thea to �• fral!Mt 
of •tM thoro ia aleo little ·aoo.'IR thtl1: nillllthat .tfle proapaot 
or peooti 1a tbore the7 .ba't'ft a •boac pn,saa&l in04mUff to 
try u4 sat tt. The, let �- ejvva1 . ftlllllb •� 'that 
tho 111"• ot' tbe Prori•1cmal DO. -.n"011 tile 1"W1 la ·nc a pleall,mt 
one. 
2'. Their ai,pear..,., • mo.mer w&ltrespoctablo .and reape-ciM � 
thq ooeily N·fctrn4 k Hr Whitelaw aa "the . Socfftar,1 (#· State• 
aad t.hey addre1J5ed -., tro:m tim.G to Um 44 11tSi.r" . the:, aad no 
bolllbastic d;tonco of �bei� peat and nuto ·no o.tt.ttcbl on tho 
!ritiah Govonment, the Britiah Anq Ol" any· othcr coamiit1os '°' . boclin in UortbeZ1l.· Ir-ela11.d :t Their re•o
·
na·e to every·
· ·
· .. -.r&WIID• 
� w thoa waa reea0fl4.l>lc enapod«rato.. ffieir behari.our u4 
atutwle app� t:0 b 1 0 relation to the indiscrud.aate 
cupa'!,pa of baal>hig: and ohoo-ting · in which tbay ba«botb. 'boell 
pz,O!ll1aent �a.den. 
p'. J WQOl>PDU> 
· 21 1uae .·� 
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H> UUa 26th July • 1972 
, , , F'W'. the-.r to my le:t1:er ,��,� -tod.Ay encloS;ing a �opy . � a.;.s�, �per on Army Qper&ti� 'in :  �rthetn lreland , 1 am .,. 
sendi�g you ,a dopy .tl� t• •'ctrUt ·.-nc1ments. to the Rules �,: 
Engilgement .whi<:h tile <:GS agr.-,ed, info,rmal ly with the Attorn@y 
Gel eral on their return journey ,£rom Nor,thern Ireland l.ast, 
•�ing . 
� - , 
Tlte . Del �nee Seci:·e t.ar y J• cQntent with . the11e i..-�i s • . on 
2, ,. , hit <:onddeu that ·the amendment 1a ac:c:eptable , in �!t� �t,tic-U•a;r 
ctrcwasta�ces of t�o operati9n in q_uegt ion I and &:\l�j�t -to the 
conc:U,tiOl:1$ And SAfEtgPXds embodi.ed within it ,. Bu't he wou11 be 
gi::a.Je�ial. 11' hct' could have the Pd.-e Minister •·• A9r9e111e�t. , -.nd also 
th�,t ot the sec.ret11ry ot &,tat� :fQ� Nor thern irel� Md 1:be 
A'tl.o�, G_,n,u·•l, i:o . �� �•o new draft . R4l es du):1tl9 the ,,oe>�l'se � 
tomorrow .-et.nee tJ,ay -,Ul �d t,o .1:>e. incorporated J.n th•t ,,qpttr•t•orwu 
Orders �. , (Jrox convenience a pli(>tocopy: of the exi'Sting Yel,low ·.card :t.• enclosed. ) 
� .  am sending copies of this le-U�r to rerty Matt and Tony 
ffe,�het ug1:�n. 
¢ w Roberts Bsq 
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TOP SECII I ,  I 
� . ..: -�l. • t,i: JUJJ· 1.fni. �- ----- A _ . ... 
DRAFT ltyLES or- . t:NGNJEMENT 
�-'!' 4-, .. • · 
t .  Soldiers mo.y fire wtd,out wnming if tbe re. is no ot,Her _;\Qy· to 
protect them��1v,s or t.hose whom t t. _ is . the_lJ\ 4�ty to prot.:ect . .  r·r� 
the danger ot being l<iHed or eer.l.oualy it\J.,_t�4. 11\ia· •p·p1ementa 
1 2  or the Yellow Card_ · · · . · 
2. For this .ope.ra-t..ion only. o C<NllPtmY ·commander.· may order the 
firing or h•a\ty ��s,pija ( such as Carl Gu��ay) egain�t positions ··. fro,n which the� is su•t•i�ed hostUe tir�t' .f,.t J:te. be.Ucvea· th�� this is 
neee.se,ary for the pre servo tion or tb• l.tvcui of soldiers or or other 
]M!racms Wh• it 1 s  bi s dut.)' (to . protec·t.. In d�cidlna whether or not 
to, u,se heayY weapons tull' ac ount . must be taken .. or the r1sk that 
�he _openlns or tire. ma_v ��dancer the lives of innocent, persons. 
* .  
tpP · SECRET - .PERTM§TER 
• :t1'� 
' lift 
'.'l:• 
.r 
• . 
APPJffiDIX :Cr Jri.t· ��» 
REDRAWING THE BORDER AJQ). POPULA'.r;(ON TRANSFER 
w .. �,(�.-�: .t:J, � � 2. � k � •i(.#4 
-A: H\WH wb 1 eb h! s oa4r ye• 19tUilll A.:tudsf.c.ul -..... 
.JHa:to»e o!4:tbe mU 1-t.Ary apro1l4:ea _.ea••- tMte aoRl&Hnee, 
! :I ·n�u,� -�•b11··1n't. Bi ott· ' · · · .'. · ,. :te4: itb r .  , ,  . ·�""«P6 ·. ;-''!"'�� . .  9,, . , .  . , ,  ,_;;;· - �-- �� . . . i  
:::::-�::i:e=���--=�
D
::t1��; .  
en& ·:-� .. feel' only-�- emotio-1 _ 'at�·�tf,'.pn )t'� tile 
Republican, �eu. :1roi accurate and' rece�t' poll.a are 
ave:ileble·; - a 1968 .poil eugpaW i�f!��iif- �(-Qi'tbtl/ti 
in tbrta tawured · a -uni tea :irjlaffil�,��:.�, a:.,�� nall · ,  ' 
, . i : _ _ - /·. : . · r.,/, . ,: - iff.>.::- -;_-: :'.'. >i,, :':.:·--� /·: �;: ...,�. �n· pointed. to simiJ.@·J�at�!;. ·-�-8: 
.1.n - :�- •�••�• ot Qy better � .. -� �Jl:�,,.�� •, 
;thtt' 1'o,-.1qwt• ·�grapbs asaµme, -th;Jt� •tbe C$.tb0lie . -����f2 v, •· . · , •· • v· . , _ • , · · " .  · · · 
, 
, i,li'y . · ."" •",, .. _.::.:>· · · j 
are .. ;t�f}i¥trM�•4 .from Northern . Iral�. 
Thia ��ster o:r pdpw..at1onei,)\ld �-a, actJieyed tiy 
. -
·· 
..
. 
, 
. 
. 
(af �(e�ing W · tbe Jlep�b11,q Q£ Ir. l�d :(or ¢�9�!�t 
{1ldJ: l'Qme ae�r-,,te· status :·within t.h� Unit�.d �u.g40,m) 
, .. ).Fq0:; 
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consideration wou1d;':be given -�/t�"«� off ••• a�aa 
lt.t - .,-, -�1•: �!�e �:0�111;;:•t ,'t.11, �st �� · : oensua-. 
(1'<> ':d�<?�>• · ttr�� :p1e�:t•��'t-•· �o� :� �o�e-, :�t �bta� 
-th. ����J'. '!'�� <Ul.; $�, - �a , -��4 -� -t.o·· µlV��� -�� y �� -
. ��-.. } --�- �Mf' �,�- . 1n#J.ml• :� ,�P /. }( #J.it: Jh�'xM, ,  
abM,tt'.� ared. �ij'.- ttdlltn,tst�a.���•- · cm�s "(�- .� -�ts,� 
� ·au����� -�ci� �roQhs �,f _ooui1:,, b�·:)r. 
� v6uii: be: t�.- ; cl on>this prf.flcl� Sueh-- -. · �Ji.I 
� have .- . '. ·bor .0:t .flaws : 
·o.) I l w�ul.4 cr«lte encl.aves ct Republ-Jtaa tettitory­
itblb.,··�em ,lreland and N�rtbern enc1aves. ' -ih 
the �P'll:>:lic·. 
-{11) It oulA tr.uat♦r ne -�y -� many 4?r�stan�> ai, 
<l•thol�cia _ 
c�ut  �,. wo@� ,\�rit� _ _  . ::_ :� ;at-r•r -�•).tQ. ,jj�i�g·1 _ 
(284.;0QO·J wbc> Uv♦:f� ·1".0�� -...  U1):le>. 1tyx,·�� . .  
tJffl,y /� •�<ft• ijl0 : .. , · , . a9r1ty. 
,(l·,.) i . .  ·•• , · · ,· •r. 9me t&i>e,e; tll. _.ti <•nt.- · • ··�leot��i1: 
I. ., 
-tJili�tJt (Tl;le,y ay be Union!a'tr!�'be,caw,t aome 
·· ta�l.toa \'C�e �tf· ; or becau •· catholic. 
imn:Ut•a oo�it-· . yow,g ._peopl eo emioi ·:te 
-�- ,o� · ·.: .tii£or,.·· : · - - votulg age ) • . . .  ';.· • - . .., , " 
;�� � Point J.t;J. could � . .. et ·byJ$Do � the �•jp_ �J; 
. -both - · t w� tllla · wutd ·l9¢.entw1t� . .  :tn1r f�j;) :f,'. · (/��,;} 
--�t•• is ah •· .1;y_- · - ·, �- •- .,-_�P .. :.�ilt' �Po · t (tr->fil>J.� 
:� for. -�t . . -_ ,_. :: .:,: /_o ;6i{ �·x�d ;t;;f -· �o, . •· Thu.-
.
·
,
t
·
'
·
:·
· · ·:
· 
.. . \p: ... ·. 
( ;� /; , .'� 
' '  . . � . . "-"' 
to' tiwaat•r w ·•*� �f tlle . �rt.-�•• if� ->t� j · Jl �r. 
1um· wout, " it2• · Ddo· ea•uct ci ··an�--�,-• •t · ·"' . ' ' . · .
. · 
.• IJU· ,;c · . . ' •• • .  ' ·. 
.
· 
.
. 
·
· .
.
. 
· • ' ,  ··
.
, ::< 
-:,;J:;:
' £v ' ; ,50(
< ;
. ,  ··• . . • 
intot'.the- ·ReP\lblicJ ict/·• .. fJ: �•· to: ·�:r•r ca�1�.e 
•, Jf�Fan<l :.re�•. rruch 'oi ·'--toaW./ c�ty ·Lc>Jdonderq­
.. u di-21 :·�GJ\·, 118:,ooo Proks.tatJW'i� 192,0QQ 
v-.�i Point HU } .t'a; .:iaoi: una.votda'5le ; ,the · 114.0® 
,♦ :· ' .  .:. �· 
. .  
Catho,11cs in Di.fast ton « -fd�iy ctoh• ive\eJ)hlave) . but · it 
c�d not!t,� linked. to other -Catho11c:·, areas Without '.inc-1lld�g · 
cc;.naiderab.le b�t • •• 
·:� •� ,�� ·of �Jc;tt •. thu.ted Xlnetom would: 
�t0.l>Y.t• _;�11;1Q� c!Wicul �•1:.,,. but q��te ,apart 
, · ;;, : ·  · -:� · , ' > '·,:, ., -, - ·. •.-¥ • ' • •
. 
:
·
- • - i-:l· -:: 
�';'.�,��, {:lt;pl./���•�.:�� �- n.p·t,(&U�ceeci .!ft reroovb;,g 
$.>:tiiji� ta. . . ftol)le wul�l hafit �{ii,i :·""· i# wl:t. ' --�•;'-.. ·•"- ' -•: ··' , . ,- _._:,," . ·.�-;·  .. ;·_,/'. _,,.-._•,,:. ;, · _ . -:· _ . . . ·:,. . � . �<,-\· ::,: :_·_ ·  .;�:<i;-, , .:/:{-; - ,, _ _  -, 
ffi:ta ,1-cf · ·,� �• toratdatil• :\\fU�: . " •� · tit'•�\ ,, . . , . . . '? ·..' , · . .  ·. , ,-'" · . . .· . . . . ·. :,· · ... . '.'., . . .. ,-:;:. • ; ". -' ' \ ,  . .  ,•." .. ,,., � 
.. ��· l� ·i��'tlon i41h"a. linil '� :�·s:t)\i .. ,, 
��;;;·��;: � :•;r�t•M��t� 
· 
.··•�!:"' · �;. ���JO-�: �  �t ;�-�-· �, :!fo�bem l��land 
i�\9· :M �-�•4�,. �.J � ��· .-uf,; .. w�v · 40 ' ,'\�-: �o_t.:a�f.l�ts 
out di -..: �� �J ••· 1n�: �•: re•iM�r ,ot: .N<>r#u�r,n �rei,�. 
;_�{��ir::r� qt :�; .population _ :·9f::�N&r��� �el� i� 
i.· · Oll"·�•A11Q�, •Sw:h .a massive •o�emen,t 'woul.� not be 
,�11;•-�;;;;���1��L,.,,. 
:�•·· ���;�t-l, llollilea.,,_s mll.unenip1Qyment\· fainee. they 
�/OU��: ��1nrfci•1t-· left :by the- �otestanta ) · ... 
� • •; •::�! : :�)�;, > � ,.: ::::_;. •;;,,,
. 
:•::,
·
• •� • • f • •:> - �:.$�'. ; A 
. 
•,
.
� :; . ,
. 
�
.
; , ,
.
, 
·
•
·
•
•: 
•�ectr:,,a�cai .aerv.feaa., 4ad\�I.: $ld· ta-oJ _Pro).on&e,d.: 
,;,, ;;: , •p; : ;  '" ·  i)- , . .  · . . • ·· . 
-� : �·ra<- ••., . ·� ""�2\ �, •  ' !' ,, . 
�lt.�iill!7�/ <,.�_ti , . 
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utJCerta1nt,- ,1m4' __ � }?¼�"�• Jiit\ny · ��� �,�J>� :tel(: �lr 
•tt; . .  - that �,r .  �: n,,r·be; the. -�• ,§: Hi - �h, P�t,iJtf!# 
· ·
·
_?:··, · ¢•,'11�,i:, �t�� :��: ,.4�•�1c� �emtijtdiN --� .il�·: 
wb,r-;: ·t11•y· - �-�- -�cl . �•tu.•� # ��"--� re�c�,� to, -,��·";:, 
it, >•4 ��fAtMt•'.· ·--· iq?�i.,.._.� ·to move �uft poor .nh��'. 
. fQ�, -�.ir �i4yaltytt t� �♦f� o,a • . .  �u,sh -tinancial 
1nd�jllifflt: ·(H)uld 'DV Nome·. aome · .J:>1:. 'tlie reluctance:, it. · til.· 
/. 
-d.ouib1ttul Whe-th&� ;tbe ·-coh s!ve,�:na·dt,lDg�rea:tholic �pulat1on 
oi. B&l:tast ·"""4<t; ,fi-gTe& : -�! -�i . · ..._ �r woul« tor �e,a . 
. boi · · ob' :,.; ,::)�e ui. •�OllOllli�...,... 
-ft��· �-• vo\��-:.p• �-:":_ )t · ��r:'�- '� 11.�:.,J-�> 
: ;�  itlii �- -rQi:4,�b�-:�: : �ic otAd na��: '.\ltt :�: , .· . 
a�to . .  o
n
n ��::'.'jl�f'iJU:�1� .of :,w.iQ 1,;hoµld, ·:lll�Vf>• Jt· ·)v 1 
d.UJi�utt' '1��:�-� ·•r1� ·· a · :· · . .  ti-- way ·_ of .atQ:e�Wn! ttl<t 
Po i.�!Q� T,ir s,. ·o.t a Pff on \'Ibo ia unwitt.11-ng to takes•�, aoti:o� 
' · , 
wbl:cfi- �'t:r t· �u .ta deid sd ·tci �aoi11tate. Parco�: 
•fll:t .. • · btea�ij' o'f .. �tt;I• .. J(l t of tit& , N < . , '« ,.;�'- :•::r. .; ' •  :, ;. , • . .Z-•/• .' '<,/:•-=•. \:.),\_- , .,•• ' •, • • . ,• • 
.·:· · bhi - }�1,t:tate BUropean Convenia..pn ( � i  it'.t · �• ,{:� Al--�.,,'"" 
,.,-"
·
: '. · ,, ..
. 
' ?,;;;·::\_:;� �-- � . �\ !, 
. . .
.
. · :· . \. 
.:�:: lj:d-,,· ·, • . - � .• ', /." ,:< -� 
·be -�•'7 . .  3�• . :-�:� - �• �• territory 'o.t th� ,state Qt •qj� 
'.':he la i Mti'onai.�•;>:� . · .  f•\. :- _ . ;._ _., -�- ) . . 
. . . > 
, !_�• . 4iJ,.·::� � �:��� -pj�t��• _h'.�� ' ��1J-h -�-t 
'.WOUld. ta b. l.i>,tw. : .��, ·to the, e�nt· -that :t� 
·�•; keep 8'1tt:o� •i<>�•� Irelan! �ho•e who.,' ' bee�, 
trans·ten-J14,: .a> .f�rmi�able bawle� of control (111<:l.uling 
· -immigr.atton:;;�b)l'f:rols) would h,,;v:� .to , b1tt :.el't&-c?ted, �ct only 
'�b'>:th,· ,n�tr--��er �t- Jit'o �� '-· . . _ ... ;ft�l1C· .�·· GH.aj) ., ' ; ·-•,· "' . .... - :.,· -,_·. . -\·,·• . .  . _._, . . . 
jj�_:_m. _ ...... ---__ -,_. - -'._f_· __,�---•_' -- · J Fl ·• t I.: .fJ ,B_·_t M!s_�'.., .,,. ,'!..,;,- � 
SrttatG. ;�i �a'tratS/vo 1:Alrd&n would. Ab.I, .qAff.8_1�••ble:; 
qds ·-: d. also -be 1ft<, breach of> its obliJ.gations· ,t<>. the 
., �.-: ' . ·. ' ' .. . . ::: ' '"-: 
·•;iojf - jree ao.-nt ,or, ,:�1,our. 
� (,_ •;·•' :, " • -�:•:•: �• :-. 
·_.x• , •
.::,:•h•., 
• • • " •, • -- "' ' ' 
I, -�r �;; •�-lj ·�'�i:;��,�l� .. -li\ -�t!on) 
G?fetJ. 11 � �i� aeum \'jtl!f :�MJi� Jt. •COJ.tl.d?;�- ff,f'��flv�ly 
cm,1••h�t � i�� brtng ll�o#t the 
dealrecl reetllt. ,;�-ie. --J.s· ·•,,,�--::1� t\lJ)poae · tbat- t�er 
of} the•, .supporte?"a and. some ot their :b.c>Jie11 t� the ii � 
,x•M�; voul4 �-2� :Iit:,.•;� � ,� ��k� 4?hwy· would t�  
1�el.y ·�t�P -�f;�·st•����J:1 .tb•- ·�•r Qt ,�
1
� 
�-r •:tep �'.-�:�- #�•9;: ·o�aect4w-. �- o:t :tii, 
,' • ' · w1.,:tfi:;Wd �,a,. .. ;, · •  '-i:Wii ooniiU' ted 1,n :11ortt1ern-.,,p " ,·' .. . .  , .' . , ' , '  ,, ' "� 1;,,, · . .  ·· · ·· ·•·. · · · .�· ""P .· ' '  . . . � - .. . . ·· .. · . , , . · ,  
�:·� ·•., ::�:� M .�'1 . .. ·�t:ii��- · ""�;;bi, 
tar • ,eillilt .. ft;ea. 
10.. In ttl•: Il'llh Repbbu.c �j,tiOl\ ;�ij� ;.�M,: 
BEE$;i���!;-. 
t)i,elt tf•�t di�'-(ij 1U,.f: �*i ·lt>would ihov :�i��r 
�� '�!-'.�. 1:�, ,�1�t j)j! ��� Bl'J.tiah, i.,�� 
All::: must� .· �
�Jt .. : : .·.
•· · .. 
·· .· . 
�:� %/:;f. succe&SQr go�emment ;wotl1d �'w�.:� -��� ·OI � ... Iriahmm,;:; a� increased 
' - - · - . 
.
, . . .  - •· . .  
·
- . 
.as'•.-.i,e.:, .J=t 
. tf>.!i; , , _
· 
' 
i f��l!!�z�-:f:::i! .. � 
<'1S;'�-�l Y�attQt•·;-9#�- ,IJ�:'1·•1>:qut,: J)ublln, .... . aoq�OIJC.enc;e:) :�4:;,;,: 
:i),�: put·:� t��e�ii���;�� _in� l�bo;�anj ·•.-o�!�- · 
9:;h@, r ·- •, I 
fl r �- I 
• 
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.that thQflt rest�· t>ie�:,.n ,��-d still be o�14e,r-. ·� 
ot the NQ,�� tre�::01ee�oril� fpr any Pleb1sc1� ob· 
tbe c01tt1nu.-gj o:t N�J:1;\i•\'li (rel� :{�· �\;�f: '.�. tJJC. 
'11 , ·ton91ua1on :1t· •iff' .t11et-♦tore �it"· ;�l>� 
yhe)t.her a. · :tranafer of -�hey. /Or. ·pQPUla�ton, coUl · • 
' ' ' '  ·,,, ' ',' '', ' ' ' . . \ • ; ' . ··
' ' ' ' ··. ' ,· ' "1!> . efteo't1veliy. -��-pliPei\,  �"111ainta!ned; ail . icitttd, \<, 
� -.f.)'(;J:.�·  ··� 
tt •"� ·:b'1ifili.li� tt; ,:o.� <be· · achieved·• whether - \it ,'W'O\lld'. 
:�• nv '.�\fhi�e:·,4t��:r· ArtJ taint 'hope . of' suooeu· · 
;,�.�  .._: se:t:•�net 'tp;e· :,.,,;1;i�t1r,• · o�· ':a course• l'lhich> "WOuld 
�-�,# � �d �·�"·• uriabl� � -� 
-�e pe-.�e«b�• e9l,µ,.��#<�I: · p�til�� ,ave �l' oxpeµ;� l�g� 
numbers o1· _ lte . �-• .c.li,hee)tJ -�:}!c;:Lng 10 'on a �i�Bi9Uti 
t>asla. 
·12. b oedin.a :;(# :�if fpe�i. :CJ( JJo���r �: _-,·_.·;_,_JI._ ·.•. 
. � . \ ::'"-<�,�-:/· . ·-��i�-:_··· /.-_�:·\:.::' . ·, ·,-: · -:-.<:.;t//,: '·' ./-\i'" . : · - . . :· -:: .-/_::\'_/\.:/:.:. /.. = �-� �-"'-<i• a l.U7ge '���<r -,�,t,.f(e.g,.,::zif' ' .· , ,  p 
Lodl�t�):;as * el•�t in .a sett�� ·r�!�ea<•', 
;.tr� .. ��t111 .. . �]not b(jen � 
SECR�j: 1, •. · .  
,) �-❖:, . 
.k 
tz'be fl'llle � baa 888D tb8 �r.:•· . . .. ·· 
41N·L ... .. · .. ··• .. . ·.i·at. .. ·• .. .. 1'¥ .. ·.•.·· .. Ia\a'I'.· ·.· .·. · . .. ·· .
.
. 
···
·
.
� 
..
.
.
. 
· · •  a\1.··.'···. oa ....... ·.• .. bY·.· .. ··. . u..·· ...·. .  s.aar .. ... · l: .. <• . . · . . . . ·. PoPo• 1D • . . .. • •  . 1n ·tne .· ' , tbe dNtt attaebld to .tbl letter -1Uob . . aeD\ 
to � on 1 . i • Ht . Uta te 
1'� a .� ot . . • •· loat . .  · .· ·. ·  tbe  ever 
·
baaoll88 Jllbl.lo. lflcatJ.oaa AN • rouawa1,.. 
. .  <·Tt .i• ,,_ •..a JIIVCD · f 11111 4 to· •at u. .... 
Del8'8 ....,.,.. 18 �. 
171 t1'st. 11111, att.el' •--11a1• 
•1--.1oa ,., • 
•. . . ,,_�=-·=--
s,ps. .. R.'1'JJliS1'.R(liQ 
�ll.lir--.SECRET 111 
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Tb,rr$•,!!�\J of S1-te. tor Northern l:reland •baa'.: �c�ted: three 
memoranda ··� GEN ?9{72') l Bt on the,�tlc;alancl eon•ti.tdonal � ol' 
Norther# Irttland; GEN !9('1'2f lij� 011 a. paclca.1• of ;-��. in.•••--·�, 
r♦port .l,y . ���- on flle l•8"- ••iwcr. of, P')-,tbt• :-�i•�. • d�t ��: 
i.trorist orgau14ations. 
:t. The1t•·· -•• -��,::�tili :�,:ilftk-4 h dlat �.,� �i�•io• .�. 
terroriam ia an. indispensable, tn.eedieat of any .•,·.··
• · • ·• .. ��t. 1B 
the ,r��• l'iJiwVJl'tJ•i.••• ·YOll may think it c���i�Ttc> .. �k(t 
OEN !f,��J;i jf:lf•t (•��: •�• • .. ject ma�r t• lf ; �---;� 
1e11• �ly. � tatse ��te Fac:tical .pNJb. 
twO' lft�nlOR� about •·out"· policy toward• U\1'l'ori,t �pld.111•ttcn,a. 
Th• Future .of NortJaer• ·kslpd 
3 .  .tn OEN 79(72) l 8r th� S"retary ot State .-.:aea that, in view 
of the ��e� �f any c�nHDBUII
. 
among the Uleter ��hate �,,1,� 
and tb• c=�Jtl.,.ty tut th♦y wc;,QJ.d unite to oppoH any aolutl� .�-� :•• 
put ��i.,1:, •. •.··• We •� l•t···tb.-m b&v;o their •ay at Qt�!� ,:��:;�:> 
25tb•21� s.-:pte�r hd e.howd then p�oduce a Gr<teo. �,-;,r �•�<� 
for g�n,r1-l):0MidJ�•.��n. the ideas which we COIUlider tt&ht. ti-•jaa 
p��@/,;J� � prea�t.fi.U.onally. with point• •m•,� I f�e�)�e c�,� •• 
4. 'the. $ecreta� of Stai.· also r4vert• to l'troJ,�"y���,•��t:°; 
t.be 8c:t�er but �its that, in terms o! legt•br.' .. ,r• F��� i,.. ,mMi·� 
•94:o� :�c,e to hi• p:ropo•ed t♦atalation to 6ii�e.h .� ';!���� 
5. FimilJy, he indicates in Ann♦¥ 1 the •·tnain el�ji,• diI• 
eooe�t��:l ����9mt . which he t\DVi•agi1t,,at the �<oi: ����>��• • 
.t .. •· �,. p..,..1:,.,11olition of sto�mo.nt • .co.up1ed ,.-ith 
.1,-,i�ri-:: �ift••�@�� in th� \Ve•tm.i¥�r Patllam:4!nt, • ·  1tre1i0Al 
,a••�l� in Beli·�;aad tb♦ �-1•1: of the laiw �4 Ol"4,o� functi. to Ule 
U'nlt«A:�j)gdom, (l��·nm•ijt. He p.-omiae■ further m�rnoranda. •J.attoratbfl 
these • t1Q••tl#1JJ� 
6. All of th!.• seerna ••olble,_ particwar1y if, ••••:.::,: · ·
·
· 
P�per were U� wtth the implication in p&l;li.1 .. l'i•tl:;��Jt )•;�,. ,; : e  
E.R. - SECRET l.ep•bl.tiqn o� th� pl•��ctt� �t .-ha,,e �, 1>� po•���ih ��•%' � jiv,e 
frtodty \o'I�• •�•ttt 1e,i•�fo�;�t;C�*,'4 • bi• o�r m���­
Publi� o�OJJ wotalct pro��f encl9d• �• •���,�•ctt o,f ri1atlve 
pi'lorltl ... ; and a ·defennent of th• ptflbl•ctte:.:llJ:rtU •a.ft o:r> •• ::,u.bllc&fioa 
of , .GJ-o,on Paper. would ,:o;a� ,_..y: �rd• r�� lb.et dele'ct in. 
th-. $-=r:•��y of-a.tat-•• •r� p�om�. t;.;:•- �t/ntet• la ttae 
_p1e1,�·�-;l'f.,�d,b•'•�--�,• wbe�e .. #:.;:1J�r-:�J1�. �t,�#n,e 
io �•,�•• (0 fJ,•IJl�•n lT-1�':,��� a;nt;'.!"4���� �-�--�•� 
�Q1'6'era lrelaml, in r:00:9t.l�l tu.me', ,a.•rf,•t•,;� �t.4 • 
accept' �l' to r�ee:t.. . .· · . . · . · ··
.
· · . . . .  ·. · ···• · . . . ·,.
··• ·• • ··· > ..•. ·. ·
··.• · ·. i ii . ,.: "!f - � ;�;�,. �"Ji ,..W _,.  JM,�,pfid .¼p .�•:1'4' . .. t. ��•·· 
·�:U �t ·at•�• &t lea•t ■o� on ol · tbe way_ la wJJi.ch ot.lr � 
I
.• �l',!'• m�!!S· And �re.- the �ect::l'•�ry of State•·.., int,nlioJl• �c 
.
.
.
.
• � Q�i 
. 
On �• oae Mad ho Ai• �a�apb 5 �f hi� caveriAS n:�) 
; .tlii'.t wd  mut •'hold back oul' view•· on .,!tfbat;:thi,,•o&.ttoa •m>.uld btf;.fo,: a• . . 
.
· . ,:· ;f , ,  :'< . , , . . t i . . .. . . ',. · 
, lOAt •• poaa�len. Oo.· the>othe r- hand he prQPQH• (pan.,r•#l &-.of 
��uu.x/-1) 0tp. 4ra,rr .
·
tu ·a�#�,,�-:� f�-�,,..-�.� •" �:'J;,.�• .. . eve._ 
,�,f�l'ct th• �r•• �-:r 1• wat,il•hflei .. -� :i,�i'.!�"�.�; .ich nHd: t� 
be· ·.�!CPl�.-•i; -�"" ·� �:�!'•1J1t', �t!�:t#•,.-If',�) ·.�. (•), :�,.._.•a, P.retty 
�le•1' le•d -to tho dlHction of hl• own thinking.. T¥ -�t� �Y 
there£ore wbh to satbfy themaelvu. how tar the s..�,••�y of �, 'd�• 
q.;,• ' 
. 
¼ 
.:tn fa�t . la tend to,ao cl,urin1: �e con:!eren<;e :au-1 at,what poUit • .1a: imt1on to 
the. plibUc•liOJl ,of Uwt :Cr-,•� Pa.,_r, , 1- �11'!101�• ..,t., .• : :�Jlo ... :.ria� ou.r 
own ini.tlona puhUc .• 
8_. 
·
l"h,._ .J,Pi!'U• of ,p,:ac��� •a;�··�� •� ��c;il. -����--c;�J;•i,9f 
the· �TelJl� of. State bttpaelf �:t1 that �;,���f:'M.et: ,,�i� it 
ma.y take,. S.  ·tn�- one thi,q which:ill' liable to unit
e
:the d--nrl•• divided 
par:ti.e• •mi to a.nlte , tbem  i.tl,�•�ft� lo OJt�a�ve,a. Aud ... , moment 
•h.».t-t •91-utfon 111 �• �bl,t�. •1'• tlk�jy�f�4?�r-• •�·• � tho �-t 
� 
� ma�um slraiJ;!:for �e :i��l,� l�t-�•� �:C�tt.«�!)wiJl jiiah ··.to 
; �r•:•, <th•r-'C>J'•! 1he &:t� •�sact,ot • :��:J•�:
j
!'e, ��♦ty:y o( 
, :_
·
'
· 
� � .
. 
tta.··
· 
·k,. whid< tl,ii &t�_,.tl!,r.)' ¢ State;�•• - �IL�•'!•' <!f bia 
A:�ex 1. 
The Sec:�ity Package 
':, � The -5'.,r.¢.r•�Y- �t st.a;�•�;�i-opo!l-18 are •�d•� i:Af.�anpb z 
,:C)f; OEN 79,(?Z);.i ,_ T�iai,M•',prqp9�\• �t �Y' �b�. ,. ·: .: . . . . -· ' . _\ ,• . ·_- - . ,. , . .,,, . . .- '.-· ·. ·.- . . ' ' ·, .· : •' ; ' .. ' ;_.,:.:,_·· . . . ._< . . -� 
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(•) MinialeH ··W;l.11· ·-Vb AtJ. difficulty in a1:r�ein1 that we ahould 
conti••�� eo ,-� ._�.�•lW-•,. �-u•� � nQT&nal �ta to 
deal ••� �r�lh�� 
(b) Thia pro_poi� $#v.olvo• ��DI B.ecwatlon H .. A. tQ ·Dl&U 
cleat::• 
(1) that tbe:F<»•crip�. of Ua. lriab. lt•publicaa A•m:Y 
:uac1��}d�� ���- w�, ...... -�;,, fhe �e�., 
(11). .iibat llli::m4¥1')fj7�Jioffii Ju· � iln ·. a m♦Mbet : >· ·..r: •> · · · .. , • .< ·• .•,. : . ,,,:;>.'.\/i:·.;··, .•,, · . ·•: · ·· ·• ·-� - - : . ··· .. · · ,. , -�• · . . . 
�:;�· i,r".�*��::m�,-�on•�-.. ,:�0��  
�o��•inl to<be .a , member of �t\q� •JUAki.ng on it• 
�J�0c Aad ..-rhapa ftn�eing a�-fund-Hi.•i�&. al•o • 
:Morip\•i,� ,an.y per■on wll� :b P'•�l �t • number 
. of �����ot:� •��u1.-.:��:1a� ;,;9i' •fii..,.,: ,� 
�i��.!JM,ti, 
Pro n1 (i}7cowd be -b. , cban ea of'..-me'.; (cL a' po . ·. : ··· : �•·r;t:;ct · ':tF ;·.;::;;/ . y .·. · · :' • · · · . · · � ; )ti/, . • . · · 
r&C&ltt lttt.elligettco r�io'i-t ·t>aat:tlie Offldiia ·wne �t�; ot 
eallillt un:�m,.J,,... the 7••1.r,t• aov<llutlona�·•.-my")•: B:ut 
there •��, Tm� �: not au.tmp-. to defl,Ae :& •�•iitt•• 
o_.,w,a,'Jl� � �:i�• �! ��ti.on ,J, � t.he C.#•��" A·*t. 
since eithei :•t th•n p�,��-: -��••a.�f �:piiov•;.:._ iev,ery •inste 
<;••• ·•&hat U..e. .�,se.nt,6:11.: m q ... ation .eatiafie• tho definition 
or we are ln the dilemma of stating conc:Uttoa• wbloh have -to i�� 
aali•Oocl while 4o�lat"iA& ubitHrily that c:ortain 011�•.:tlon, 
aatt,t;f�pi. 
P:roi,o•al (U) ��y r+�••,:,,,�� on.us of:��� ii' .�r�t;1 u 
is in<:umb•nt .• ·on f&., «t�t•��;to:;••�••· ·ld:•··•·�oe.oac.e ·.to•�a"of 
on the pro•ocutlon to.e•-lt1h lds �•· But'�• 1eem• inhe.-ent 
in tho' .�tl&re-ol'. the,�,�i 
(c) In f•v,�� •��• lf1••.·PJ'.opo•�· to �tr�\lC;• •�C)J-.J . . c�.;t.:. ;�� ,�l��,:: 
(""ick:lf�o;�J,��•ju! in Appendix 1 ,,� G�N,·79(f;i) t1),,Jj. · ,# b<t 
argued, �t w�f,���'bt.ptl�pl� be •••def\\�, a �kl 
p•�c�•• fd�, 'tb♦: � 1'••• :�n•,b�y \Vbieh at ,��.••-.� •�•r• 
1 .. __.,� �: .
.
.  �J� ,.m  . .,...,��f'" C®�-�J".,,t4)·•ffl� •.� :.�!:s:•. if1 
Q{ the :�i�{ ��•• Jijfflsq;l-.'.•'ft'�l�-lf:f c>(� .. 
�e c:o��j,. •*•n••l�, ,a�ai#aJJb: f�t�-;� u,. 
(lE'N ,,(r�l lJJ;. '�:. tbe Attome y GuJ��. :.o may: �� -�• 
;Ji,,; 
E.R. - BOUT ew,po.-tM b:f the Lord �ellor. 1a likely to ffllpha.;.•o the 
dl:Ulculty of.••••ia� judge-• with tho kind ·of court cleecrib.ecf 
,b;a;pa�•araph t o! Appen� ·1 t.� GEi'{ 7<Jl?Zl 1 7. If Miniete1'a 
&t,'4J c:���. ho,!•�, ttiai,t •o ����ai al •pec:1'1. �«mr'­
.9,1' 't�4tt�a';wc,� have f: :m&'f,W, impact � w�a c,f·��ll�f;� 
t:Prori•ta, tBe pt,lUical ptiH m&:Y I>• �ht t<> 'be woi".th ,a.yJ,iiJ;. 
Bllt, if •o, lt will , •• ACe••ur to .1in4 -room {or - aec,.:�•rr 
tegi-1,A�,n; -..u!: •om• ;otJa,r it.m a tb• luf.•lattve pnw�o: 
1�Y :la&�• 'to j�, �rill.;.�. 
(cl) �- ���ilt. �t •�au�·;� OAd. t:a•-..t will tla,re. ··��� 
.jij,�t boUl �•••.�· ���� at Wi.•�tliir ·� "1,� @ 
SDLB �· N'orth�ra ��f A• r•1•:rcl• the "hal'.d ·core"· ,1'JJf 
eAJmOt IM •relu•�� t11e,Seczetaq-�-� t. ;J)2'0Roa1i•;c_fha�:;·M-.1 
'. . ·.·· · . . · -.
. 
--:--:_' .. _. ·<:t . ·-.· . . · ::_ ·:_ .. ' .
. 
·-· .-.. _t;/ 
."•> _ ;:: : =··:·< 
... : . . 
,.-,-.:;· 
. . ,, .. . _-- _- ' � .. . i,�:� 
<U.. er . ..UGJJ)..9-fidle ��. c�. lhe:.U.ludll&la co.culll!d 
,�ho* c�M t:<) be do:ta�� µnd�r RAtgulation U, eubject to 
·:-.
.
•tin!e
·
.
· 
· ' '." b. · · . a 
0• cl-1 lnterlm ·tiN: . :•> · .. t. �.·.-· ,
>: :;::)S.b:• ....... -..:.·· : · ,,ot,G .. 
, .. • ... ·· 
•· +1 ; . , . .-: y '  � . . .  · .. . , 
.
. ,. ·�;' · , ; .· < ·. , . .  · _,,,,, /', . ''i''c. ,•� 
���-�:•• '.•� tbi• may b.e �cceptable � -the SD.LP. -� �Y .withdr�w -�·� -� pro,�ted contot-�• aa a i-e•w.t. �. •J: 
con.fer-cmce le .like�){' to b• '@producuvo .ia. any event• lhi• ;t>ri�•• 
t09., .may .bo tho� ,,.-ozifi; payjq. 
(e) to bealn fo .. d�t• tlw ��· Po•�• ��t will b� potiti�-1).y 
�p\llar. ��� ... aph l *f th, Annt:1.x to GEN ?9(?Z) 19. :.��1'; 
����••• i4itad�- ,o� tlw ·tbn• btlcls tllo•e parts o( .. 4'#t 
which confer powar• on. the ••�urlty tore••• The•• &re 
K 
:::=i:.::: rela�:�;� l;..::r;:: .:tc; . �� do 
(�. ' ·Qi.yen an •�·l9,'. . ',tl�:���1#. �re •ff'·��:\�� 
:�r.,•v• to::�,•���·�9 .  -�.r ��tioa u ot ,-n�� 
-•�!e•ted ••· �:tt<orl•i. UJatil apec:ial �=-'-· or �tb�� ,t� 
, . ·. . . . . . • .•• ,, ... ;''• 
. i ''. 
intl'oduoe4. All pointed ou.t . 111],a.raar•ph 3 of A�:S: to 
� l9U�) 1,. h.�•�J:'.,. �- :Win ce�tajl\Jy be atuci.�:-· a 
4ija�s4td fc>�•�:�;���·•1A,f�- tbe p.-ovJ•loa 9f tl'A!i· P;:•�--
��.� l'�ife,J '���-�•, t.() ·�•. �o� .«:•�-­
�• ·�r -..-1 .�, �� :•t•�w ·��: hocly" lt.l•��;;, 
�l'ittci■,m ? 
10. fte·;,pr.a.c::t.ical ft,npU•tlr.»1• a'l'.e: +.:; . . . 
(i) �tdl•te: am.J��nt• �'�1-¥on ¥.A. by .Ol"dn ia:;\��: 
�•t tbe ,•a•n<=Y Pli.ic--•••· It will:bct uec�•••i,. :, •�n 
��l�tt� I"••���-.. iJ•t'lfr �o(ng. ·.fil, . the ,Reee1i.•-.t: 115 
E.R. -1 1 6 >:�T;�(<j)8¥if·�7. :f\!}· �:�'.-:--�·<Y'\f h·/·rv,:z0i\.�J( _+ <¥\ 540 .. #t SECRET •�•�lnl ,v�� -n,;t� nc,t �t �!� ry �� d,t! �ta•• wa,:'-1ttfog? lt ala()· ��•�..,,;'. ��: Mhitatera jrcJ :•ti:� ; tha:t the iHue'• are not aw;:-h ..  to:ari'aat;a Dill. (b) The int.-9d.uctlon of lttti•lati<»a· a• toan.•alF�••lblif t<l;,pr.cw.lde for the,"'e,�ibme,_._ -�\•�dal �·'- or-.trlb�:.••lto ;:,r�a1 �•<'.<?� :1u,u�♦ (T���itf:t,���),�ct 'fNn4un 1�1aac) _;:it,o u 1u·o,.�iln-:@,�••J1b'.t:i:Jf ��  to • . . . . . · .. , . . · •  · ,  . . . . . . · :r :: . • GEN 79('1:Z) 1 9,. 'J:ti · .. In the• tinal ••l\tem:e . of GEN 79(12) �i/\� Sft�ta� '�;��it : �-ftl,, 111,:,,eoU•�• to • u,i1e:et vl&ble alterutivea to ·•,Wi , '· , · udt;�•/ .. pr�.i,. lt i• diffieQl.t to •ria•l•/What tll•h·ticould b.e� ��h -�i!:!::=a;:.;;=:;�-��• take •Wl �or•: �,� once ·the:&ilt!�t��: i�et��;:�:���tB,,tt lf:�:,: ·fully �tional. lft ,o._r wol'd.a the -� �bf•ht''U:#r,��J, to·,_. d"tlve muclti 1"fote·,tbe,: ye&1' Of dirttct rule··:��ee �;�ll;·� .. ri�(;_;,: :3 ' ., . . · . . ,, . . . · : . . .  _ :- .. -·� :: -{ :_ :-··: ·•: : :,-./\\·.;,,\.:';_::·':"' _ ,':• . . . --'\'- >:.i.\'./"tf<·;".'.'./ -'�-----.:::C .� : lda�h• 1 91t,) ,and -.�•-».�•--•-��j;JJ .... cqa1tlt\ltloul: tol�•·&,.• to -.,�· pot 1,nto eUjo;t '.(�e-■ '!'• a�� :��pued. or ;¢ompe,Uect. io ext.,_d dired r:w-. ,� • !lUthu ,peljo(l). If the �lill'i'1lt:W♦' $•f�•--- on thia .pomt. wW they. admit that the t�:r,�:]'qli•Pl�,...i,���\��;: ·�ll cd�ue (!or how loocn into ih:o pe�Cof4the ·pet-�anent aeW.ment-? l! lt doe• IIC>t, lt l• hi.J,dJ.y worth the· tr��- of le�•�. ij,: �-1'•.ato, 111.e :�ij-: Bilt� ¥ it doee. we ,ball. 1-�,. �- '.�-��: •l�a: �t, -,l�h the p,-�t· •�t8-���},e,; � in· •J,ileh u., $!�,:etar, <>.( State envtaa1•• 1�;• pai-aai"aph 1 0:� �  l to :CEN- '.1,9("l ,:l8. "'1! ' ' .· .  ,-:. . . . /· .. -:· ·.' ;' ,;::, ,i ,,-:, :· .. ;:,(,,>· , . .. -� result 1n Northern lreJand'• becomlil.1 more .rather �J•••: ��>tf ;�� Unitoo :ktnad.om (-ttb. hac:'iden�, incnat�d . represontatm in th.ii P.:�J��eat a:�'iW'e•�•ter), we •�;�¼il�t;i';t- :•••U.Jilit1;-·_: .. (_._ . :, •�,:-=· . _.-- .. :r. · ·•-�· :-. : ' : . .. . " ·-_,,:-:· . ·_ \-1::�;- =: "❖ ' �dle ,:Pr°"�•·:a jll.didal •ntein whicl wo�d �t,.�e •��•·•�;..,. "1�;���1 part 1" �e Vni�il Kh?"�i Thie �Y o, �"�t: a� 1ijI·;• p,t•e��m in :tlk•·�P��- 13\'lt :it� ;'�I�- nty . .. , to,4� .. ·;u it . , ·. ; , . ·  , · · . . '._. · '(t1 ' . . - - ., �-.,.:' :<.�. :::., · : ' .: . · .. . _ .. , . .  _ · �.· · . ,  . . , has to la•t for :n��� L� ' i,tt.;J :Ith September t 197!;i -s-
-I 
I 
Co.·. ·· · .· ·N· ·. ·. ··.r,D· ·· · ,�N· • ··r· · 1··· .� ·. ·. .  
,� �,,., 
. ·. · . . 1-i Ci l"\l. . . lf,r qw.. .... 
M f N I  STIil¥ C, F  :D, E ft:. N <:f'� 
M A IN B U I LD I N G .. Wt,nTEHAU .. jt L0,1'4 DO N t  s. w�-• 
OONFJDB.NTIAL 
Md 19/3A 
lk 
!)ut·· �rr,t..,. 
T·ttl.CflMONC WMJ"rat�4 70:ai 
(JJ� 
a9tJ;a Movember ·l.972 
A't . . the -N 7.9 (72 )331:d meeting al) U�h. Sept�er the Pdme 
Milµ•-i: ·•·d .t�t f'.the qu�sUon o� aeuera . o;f . !IW UDR who were 
al•o ·a.s,ocl-.ted wi::lb �; Ul?A required :f\l�the� consideration. 
•• · �•;tU')" ot S't�t•, (t'9l' - ffortbern Ir.el.and) sbQuld circu1ate 
a : nc;>te ' ifllli�•'tlftf wh�'t . he pr<>posed0 .. 
'the. policy •� torce at t:h•t time was e stabli,;bed in July 
197.2 jn·· :the Ught of three major :facto¥'.&.. First . t.hcf U'DA is *' 
an il1e9al. oxganisat'lpn and membership of it is  not an of:fence 
unde.r military law; Second1y . an important £unction en tho UDA 
�• 10 ·channel into a constructive and <licSci,l>�ined direction 
ftr��•·t&l,lt energies which might o therwise become dis�uptive . 
fl.'titdl.y, a1though an application to join the . UDR wou1d ;'110'
t be 
autmati�lly rejecte<l because . o.r UDA mesnbersh,ip• . clue weigb'.t 
wo\\ld . be, '.g:lveb in tit� \Petting :JJr<>eess to extreme: ;,X-ot�ejant 
,,,.�thi•s •and· a f!�,,n known to be a ••be.r of the .. · U:l:>A woul� 
be most un.likel,y to �· admit ted . 
Against this backgro� , th� ·_ pol�cy ••��,.,� in 4�)' 
was that . .. an ofL'i.�er sbou1d ha u•'d. to . �••S:p: . u· he . tOQk an 
active i-,it in UOA :•tivi Ua. . A: .,liG•, would :�: warned u 
suspected �f sufficiat - •YDlPa1:hy £or UDA .• .a:ims -to a:ff'ect his 
military- ;�ti.es � c;-11 ln quest ion his loyalty_; _ , U . his 
conduct ad.Ung . �:r- JJJ>.\ membership . cons ti tu ted & ail:i taxy 
offence or· un•ati.s.tactoi:y, Cf,,lnduc t, he would ,be clism:.ls.sed. 
this polic)' --,u kept. under review _, bU� onl.y recent ly b&s 
it i,.�n �01u;;£d,rt� pecessary to make changes . Following 
discus•� wi'th • GOC, , and  consul tation with tbe Seq.retary 
ot St&'t4e -1:or Ncrtt)ern Ireland, the �:fence Secretary bas 
dec�ded to app1y th'is policy, more !!Strict1y .. . He mis 'tblt;rete>;re •PJi'r�� ·a new Regimental._. ,Routi.G-ca Order· which was 'l ssued 9n 
,2"7tJi .No'\$� . I a 1:tach 't$1: '�J ct' tbi.s' at Annex. X't wa 
c w RobflJ:'.ta , a,q •. 
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'aC>l c;<>JW�e� del:iirabl.e c: pr�cti.cal to make ateiilb••�P,.::;�i 
'the . up�\. :�(bar '. in itsel:! to mem.bership o'I the . UDR • .  · ,  ,()�,: ·.··• .. . '•,: :. 
�J:•:•AA�flo� rea&Ol\$ .. . tlu.l Or<leJ" �o re.t�•- t'); • .,����p; 
o� · th•: ��1i.c . ti-Se,rvkenien • s A1'·soc.iatiQ1i' whicll MW;�;jtJ:•t : 
Republi� sympathies . 
Followino this new . Order, off;ws _whose !-9�� 
sus.1tect .  ,.will.�be . uke��...._ox:: redgp : soldiet:s will be 
di�sed under thEf xegu.lat.ton which allows th.is 'to be done 
because "thCt:ix tle;yi�sl AXA. no longex r §quired".• . No apeoj;.ti� 
exp1anat ion wlb be given;  we ecnploy only those � .wish to 
continue 'to employ and our �c:rtion ·will be within 'the t�.rms 
and· conditions aec:epted on joining -.tbe Qe9.imerit • 
. �f;4o i,,ot �t �t; �f c·�e wlU r••ulf �::·:•�I 
-�• ·•·. abollt ,$0 5!i�IJ!&'Sjal•f �- they will ,_ 'cuff�·· �� 
9ra;du&1w; ever a p.u:�ocl; , tXI.· �u� - .. ks.  ' . · . 
, , :;:Jj � Stitdipv· ·c<Jptes oL -thi, ie·tte:t 'to Antc»ly �l�', 
Terry ;Plat't , Graham. M\�l and 'l'o,-,- H9thednvtc:m, - �. ,Q '.:Bd.p 
llorb!IJ;y• 
-t.- � 
( R A OJST-JS ) 
- • 
MBMURSHIP OF . BXf:B.BM!ST ORGANl:SA't-IONS 
1. �1: ac,:l'�t:laa ,by _..-,era o
f 
. sectarian: «'>t�•att:cma 
ha.ve _sbJ.nm a 1'4"9d to c1u:t1y tbe po1'.i;cy �· ••�t• of' the 
UDR -.ho- �• tiwolvod. in such orgmjbati<ms o tbtl 'VDA , aiid �; ' ' ' ' ' , , , - � 
2 .  . Tile Ut)R . �• . . � non-$et lta;rian force , a� any ,adiv .· < • 
involvement s-�· &; sectarian o.(9anisa_tion is bound t<;, eall 1'l�: 
que.stiori a. soldier 1 s •uitability -f_or cont1nu-1d, inembersbip' ili ·· 
t.he Regiment . i.�; a.· soldier ••  sympathy for 1 ,�he UDA , QSA <,r:½
1 
any sim:ilax- organisation is  strong nough to: af'::fect the 
peit'ormance ol his military du ties or 'to call. in question 
··bis , future 1-oyalty or bi complete impartiality I h will 
be discharged. 
3-� We have tea.ch� the stage . where fl'cm Who. �'. l�l',8,1 to 
Her ,rajestv ;�:t make a cl•� d0¢ision/ ..  �- �bei'� ;they 
st� , and ••t: i:ealise that the best •tY . ti.;) oorit.r:ibµ:te t� 
the ,ate y 9t th1t . c:�ll-l1:Y 18 to give· tMir undivided support 
to the Secu%�� Po�c••• 
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